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Executive Summary
Real-time fault management during ascent and entry ranks among the most safety-critical of
spacecraft operations. On the shuttles, confusing Caution and Warning system indications,
outdated cockpit display formats, and “hard” (manual) fault isolation and recovery interfaces
exacerbate fault management time and difficulty. On next-generation spacecraft, these “legacy”
display formats will be replaced by state-of-the-art display formats and “soft” (electronic) crew-
vehicle interfaces. Previous studies indicate that, relative to shuttle, these interfaces will enhance
crewmembers’ fault management performance considerably. Opportunities exist to enhance
performance even further by incorporating additional forms of fault-management automation,
particularly in the areas of fault diagnosis and information retrieval. However, next-generation
vehicles face very stringent weight, schedule, and cost constraints. Ideally, vehicle designers
should have access to quantifiable metrics on the performance benefits provided by candidate
forms of automation to make informed cost/benefit
 analyses.
Performance enhancements associated with selected forms of automation were quantified in a
recent human-in-the-loop evaluation of two candidate operational concepts for fault management
on next-generation vehicles. The baseline concept, called Elsie, featured a full -suite of “soft”
fault management interfaces. In many ways, fault management with Elsie was more advanced
than on the shuttles (for example, off-nominal procedures were worked through an electronic
procedure viewer [EPV] linked to virtual switch panels). However, operators were forced to
diagnose malfunctions with minimal assistance from the standalone caution and warning system,
which deliberately emulated the workings (and limitations) of the caution and warning system on
today’s shuttle.
The other concept, called Besi, incorporated a more capable C&W system with an automated
fault diagnosis capability. In addition, Besi included functional links between the C&W
database of fault messages and the EPV database of off-nominal checklist titles, which
automated the process of bringing up the correct procedure checklist on the EPV. In exchange
for these and other targeted investments in fault management software, Besi provided a more
streamlined, user-centered fault management concept than Elsie.
Eight trained participants worked one or more systems malfunctions during simulated Orion
ascents, some with Elsie and some with Besi. In parallel with their fault management duties,
operators were tasked with noticing and responding to occasional color changes on their primary
flight display (PFD) symbology. Operators worked systems malfunctions more quickly,
accurately, and with less reported workload with Besi than with Elsie, particularly when they had
to manage more than one malfunction. In addition, they missed fewer color changes on the PFD.
These results were summarized in an earlier report (Hayashi, McCann, Beutter, Spirkovska, Poll,
& Sweet, 2007). Since then, additional analyses were completed of operators’ manual inputs and
eye movement behavior. The results more precisely resolve the source of Elsie’s advantages,
and provide better understanding of operators’ display usage, information acquisition, and multi-
tasking strategies. The most important findings, together with their design implications, are as
follows:
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1. On average, Besi’s automated fault diagnosis capability saved approximately 19 sec of fault
management time. Automating the process of bringing up the target checklist saved an
additional 20 sec. The software required to functionally link the advanced C&W system with the
EPV database was minimal compared to the software required for the automated diagnosis
capability; thus, straightforward information integration provided the biggest operational “bang”
for the software investment “buck”.
2. For both Elsie and Besi, most of the time required to complete proximal (“root”)-cause fault
diagnoses and bring up the designed off-nominal checklist on the EPV was consumed by
processing text on cluttered (text-rich) display formats. With Elsie, however, operators
incorporated extensive processing of fault messages on a C&W fault log display into their fault
diagnosis activities, and had to navigate through one or more text-based menus to bring up the
correct checklist of fault management procedures. Processing text from these sources consumed
an average of 31 seconds
 for Elsie versus just 11 seconds for Besi. These findings suggest that
fault management system designers should seek to minimize operators’ reliance on text
processing wherever possible, particularly
 on high-density text-rich displays. Task elements that
require text processing should be high-priority targets for automation. If automation is not
possible, high-density displays should be structured to reduce search-based behavior.
3. Analyses of fixation patterns and transition probabilities between system summary displays,
C&W fault messages, and the EPV revealed that operators processed individual sources of fault
management information repeatedly, often after consulting other concurrent sources of fault-
management information (cross-checking). The pattern strongly suggests that if vehicle
designers opt for a more Elsie-like (less computationally demanding) concept of fault
management operations, C&W system interfaces, system summary displays, and the EPV should
not be forced to time-share design real estate; instead, they should be viewable simultaneously,
possibly on a single consolidated fault-management display format. Time-sharing these
information sources would be much less detrimental with a more advanced (Besi-like) concept.
4. During the time that operators were actively working a malfunction, they regularly interrupted
their fault management activities to check the Primary Flight Display. If the malfunction was
being worked with more machine assistance (Besi), these checks were performed more
frequently than when more of the fault management burden was on the operator (Elsie). The
increased willingness to interrupt fault management and redirect resources to the concurrent task
is evidence that in a demanding multi-tasking environment, like ascent/entry, high-level
strategies for time-sharing information acquisition activities across concurrent tasks are sensitive
to the level of automated support. Given that these high-level (strategic) adjustments to
information sampling behavior were accompanied by better performance on the PFD-based
color-noticing task, automating high-workload components of fault management benefited all
tasks in the environment. This result should factor into cost/benefit d cision-making concerning
the efficacy of automated support tools in high-workload multi-tasking environments like next-
generation spacecraft ascents and entries.
5 of 57
Table of Contents
1.	 Background ........................................................................................................................8
1.1.	 Fault Management Operations on Shuttle .................................................................8
1.2.	 Fault Management on Next-Generation Vehicles: Challenges and Opportunities ... 9
1.3.	 Additional Opportunities ..........................................................................................11
1.4.	 Problem Statement ....................................................................................................12
1.5.	 The Present Study ......................................................................................................12
1.5.1.	 Limitations of Traditional Measures .....................................................................14
2.	 Methodology .....................................................................................................................15
2.1.	 Simulator Facility ......................................................................................................15
2.1.1.	 Displays and Procedures .......................................................................................16
2.2.	 Elsie ............................................................................................................................17
2.3.	 Besi .............................................................................................................................22
2.4.	 PFD Monitoring Task ................................................................................................24
2.4.1.	 Operators .............................................................................................................. 26
2.4.2.	 Data Collection .....................................................................................................26
2.5.	 Summary of Previously Reported Findings ..............................................................28
2.6.	 Focus of the Present Report ......................................................................................29
2.6.1.	 Display Real Estate and Display Availability ........................................................29
2.6.2.	 Display Usage: Where did the time go? ................................................................30
2.6.3.	 Information Acquisition Strategies and Display Real Estate Requirements........... 31
2.6.4.	 Multi-Tasking Strategies .......................................................................................32
3.	 Eye-Movement Data Processing ......................................................................................33
3.1.	 Raw Eye-Movement Data ..........................................................................................33
3.2.	 Identifying Fixations ..................................................................................................33
3.3.	 Classifying into Regions of Interest ..........................................................................34
3.4.	 Definitions of RT Phases and On-Task Times ..........................................................35
4.	 Results ...............................................................................................................................37
4.1.	 Percent Display Usages ..............................................................................................37
4.1.1.	 Aggregate Display Usage during D1 .....................................................................37
4.1.2.	 Percent Display Usages during C1 ........................................................................38
4.2.	 PFD Monitoring .........................................................................................................39
4.3.	 Further Breakdown of Display Usage during D1 .....................................................39
4.3.1.	 Outlines of the Display Usage Flow during D1................................ ...........40
4.3.2.	 Display Usages and Fixation Transitions by D1 Sub-Phase ...................................41
5.	 Discussion .........................................................................................................................48
6 of 57
	5.1.	 Impact of Automation: Elsie versus Besi .................................................................48
	
5.2.	 Display Real Estate Requirements ............................................................................50
6. Conclusions .......................................................................................................................52
7. References .........................................................................................................................53
8. Appendix A: Eye-movement analyses following C1 ........................................................54
	
8.1.	 Percent Display Usages during D2 ............................................................................54
	
8.2.	 Percent Display Usages during C2 ............................................................................54
	
8.3.	 Percent Display Usages during R ..............................................................................55
9. Appendix B: PFD Look Statistics during D2 and R .......................................................57
7 of 57
1. Background
1.1. Fault Management Operations on Shuttle
Suppose an onboard system experiences a malfunction during the most dynamic phases of a
spacecraft mission, ascent or entry. Crewmembers must be alerted immediately so they can
diagnose and understand the source of the problem, and then complete a checklist of procedures
to minimize operational impacts and (if possible) maintain (or restore) mission- and safety-
critical aspects of system operation. These activities often have to be completed quickly to
prevent the problem from escalating into a life- or mission-threatening situation. Along with the
extreme time pressure, there is little safety margin for a crew error, such as misdiagnosing the
source of the problem or executing an incorrect isolation and recovery procedure.
To meet the need for fast and accurate fault management, astronauts spend hours practicing fault
management-related operations in ground-based simulators. In the case of the shuttles, these
training requirements are greatly exacerbated by the fault management interfaces. Apart from
sounding cockpit alarms, the caution & warning (C&W) system, designed in the 1970’s, does
little more than flag off-nominal sensor values, generate a visual indicator (typically, an up or
down arrow) beside the out-of-limits value on the appropriate system summary display, and
generate fault messages. Because the shuttle systems are so complex and highly interconnected,
a failure of one component often generates off-nominal operational modes, and out-of-limits
sensor readings, in subsystems and equipment located “downstream” of the initiating
malfunction. All too frequently, the result is a cascade of C&W alarms, multiple fault
indications across several system summary displays, and a lengthy list of fault messages on the
“fault log” display.
Collectively, these cockpit indications constitute a C&W system “event”. For the crew, a C&W
event forms a collection of often confusing symptoms that must be carefully evaluated in order
to determine the source of the problem - what is sometimes labeled the “parent” malfunction.
Functionally, this diagnostic process usually culminates in choosing the fault message judged to
be most closely associated with (or most proximal to) the parent. This is because fault messages
are isomorphic with the titles of the off-nominal checklists in the onboard flight data files (or cue
cards), and so the checklist is selected by matching the parent fault message to a checklist title.
Once the crew has selected the appropriate checklist, operational challenges continue through the
fault isolation and recovery procedures. Navigating through paper checklists is a complicated,
multi-tasking activity that requires frequent switching of attention between distinct information
sources in support of multiple sub goals and activities. For example, a common procedure calls
for the operator to reconfigure the operational mode of the system experiencing the malfunction
(e.g., by opening a flow control valve that is normally closed). To make it so, the crewmember
must locate and physically toggle a switch on one of the many switch panels that cover the
interior of the shuttle cockpit. Once the switch is thrown, the crewmember must verify that the
new operational mode has been achieved, either by examining “talkback” indicators on the
switch panel itself, or by checking sensor readings on a systems summary display. He (or she)
must then shift attention back to the checklist and re-establish (from memory) what steps have
been completed, and what the next to -be-completed step is.
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Adding to the difficulty of checklist navigation, checklists typically conta in logical conditionals
(e.g., ÒIf nonisolatableÓ or ÒIf isolated”) that, depending on their resolution, establish different
pathways through the remainder of the list, with some (to-be-performed) procedures staying on
the pathway, and others (to-be-ignored) falling off. With few or no visual cues (e.g., arrows,
lines, common indentation levels, etc.) to link the individual procedures of a pathway together,
the operator must construct and maintain a mental representation of the pathway – and keep track
of his or her place within it – mostly from memory. In a recent study of fault management
performance in a part-task shuttle simulator at NASA Ames Research Center (McCann, Beutter,
Matessa, McCandless, Spirkovska, Liston, Hayashi, Ravinder, Elkins, Renema, Lawrence, &
Hamilton, 2006), researchers found that checklist completion times lengthened dramatically
when the pathway encompassed widely separated procedures. In one case, involving a safety-
critical leak in the helium supply system to the shuttle’s main engines, several participants failed
to navigate to the final “orphan” procedure at all, despite extensive training that emphasized it.
As if all these difficulties were not enough, during the dynamic flight phases of ascent and entry,
the crew must time-share any fault management activities that may arise with other critical tasks,
such as monitoring the vehicle’s attitude, velocity, and flight path on their primary flight display.
Checklist developers endeavor to relieve the burden during these periods with "short-list"
procedures that postpone as many activities as possible to a less dynamic period, such as when
the shuttle reaches orbit. Unfortunately, limitations in sensor coverage and other factors often
render the exact nature or location of a malfunction ambiguous. In these cases, even the short
lists must include preliminary troubleshooting procedures to determine the nature of the
malfunction more precisely, adding considerably to malfunction resolution time and crew
workload.
In summary, fault management on the shuttles – with their confusing C&W interfaces, legacy
system summary display designs, and requirements for paper checklist navigation – can easily
overwhelm the crews’ attentional and cognitive processing resources, particularly during the
dynamic phases of flight when these resources are already stretched thin. Fortunately, the
shuttles operate close enough to the Earth that communications systems are able to provide a
near-real-time stream of vehicle telemetry (including sensor readings) to Mission Control Center
(MCC). Along with the crew, MCC flight controllers and systems subject-matter experts
continuously monitor these data for indications of anomalous behavior. Much like the onboard
C&W system, ground software flags out -of-limit parameters, sometimes using tighter limits than
those used onboard in order to detect potential faults more quickly. Additionally, as ground
software can be upgraded more easily than Shuttle software, it is closer to the state-of-the-art in
sensor fusion and data processing capabilities. For example, ground software provides trending
information on some main engine parameters in graphical form. Armed with these tools, ground
personnel typically assist the crew with disambiguating the parent of a C&W event and
determining the appropriate response. A crewmember must still locate and flip the proper
switches and verify that isolation and recovery procedures are proceeding as expected.
1.2. Fault Management on Next-Generation Vehicles: Challenges and Opportunities
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Decades ago, an ongoing revolution in aircraft operations was initiated by the arrival of the first
generation of glass-cockpit aircraft, featuring integrated avionics architectures and soft
(electronic) crew-vehicle operational interfaces. Although the shuttle cockpits were upgraded
from the original electromechanical instruments and CRT displays to glass starting in the late
1990s, the display formats (and associated operations concepts) were largely ported from the
original versions. Fully recognizing the opportunities afforded by glass, shuttle operations
experts completed a comprehensive cockpit avionics upgrade (CAU) project, including a
complete redesign of the shuttle cockpit displays (McCandless, Hilty, and McCann, 2005). Due
to time and budget constraints, the shuttle cockpits were never upgraded to support the
redesigned displays. However, a high fidelity shuttle mission simulator at NASA Johnson Space
Center was upgraded to support the CAU display suite, and a thorough human-in-the-loop
evaluation of the operational impact of the redesigns was completed in that facility. “Crews”
assembled from astronaut office personnel worked a wide variety of shuttle systems
malfunctions during short periods of simulated ascent and/or entry, once with the existing
display formats and again several months later with the upgraded formats. With the existing
display suite, crewmembers failed to recognize (diagnose) fully 30% of the problems in the
highest workload scenarios, where multiple independent malfunctions occurred in close temporal
proximity. Only 10% of these malfunctions were unrecognized with the upgraded suite.
By observing the crews in real time, subject matter experts were also able to assess the impact of
the redesigned display suite on how long it took crewmembers to diagnose malfunctions. The
subset of malfunctions whose diagnosis times placed them in the slowest quartile, relative to the
entire set of malfunctions included in the study, took an average of almost two minutes to
diagnose with the current display suite (presumably because these malfunctions were associated
with the most confusing C&W events). The average diagnosis time was reduced to 76 seconds
with the upgraded display suite, for a full 44-second reduction.
The fact that the redesigned displays yielded sizable reductions in the time to understand the
malfunctions is noteworthy. The longer a system remains in a faulty state, the more likely it is to
degrade to the point where functionality cannot be restored. For instance, the longer an auxiliary
power unit runs with an oil leak, the more likely it is that the reservoir will empty and the unit
will seize (or worse). Less obviously, the faster a crewmember can work a malfunction, the
lower the chances that a second, unrelated malfunction will occur before he or she has finished
with the earlier problem. Human operators have very limited capacity to handle even one
malfunction in conjunction with the other operational demands they face during dynamic flight;
having to handle more than one degrades their performance considerably (McCann, et al., 2006).
The results of the CAU evaluation were clear: modern, task-oriented system summary displays
produce dramatic improvements in the crew’ ability to make sense of their cockpit indications
and maintain better situation awareness of system state and status. However, the CAU redesigns
were limited to existing electronic displays and interfaces; the CAU project did not attempt to
replace the hard crew-vehicle interfaces in the shuttle cockpit, such as the paper-based procedure
booklets and hard switches, with electronic versions. The new generation of Project
Constellation vehicles will have much less interior room than the shuttles, and are being
designed amid stronger pressures to minimize vehicle weight and development costs.
Consequently, virtually all vehicle operations will take place through a small number of
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electronic (glass) panels. As far as fault management is concerned, an electronic procedure
viewer (EPV) will replace the paper checklists found on the shuttles, and operators will perform
mode reconfigurations largely via “soft” (electronic) representations of switches (or switch
functions), rather than hard (physical) switches.
The transition to a full suite of “soft” crew-vehicle interfaces presents operational concept
designers with
 abundant opportunities to improve fault management operations. For example,
following the lead of EPV designs on modern glass cockpit aircraft, the preliminary design for
the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle EPV includes a colored focus bar that highlights the next to-
be-completed line in the fault management checklist. The bar moves automatically to the next
line in the procedure when the current procedure is complete, automatically skipping lines that
fall out of the pathway. Through features such as these, the EPV will simplifies the task of
navigating through a checklist and lessen the navigational workload on the operator (McCann et
al., 2006).
Of course, there is no such thing as a free lunch. All information displayed on soft interfaces has
to be represented electronically. Useful as they are to the operator, advanced display features,
such as the EPV focus bar, obviously require software. Compared to the software requirements
for fault management on shuttle, therefore, the wholesale conversion from hard to soft interfaces
on next-generation vehicles will entail unavoidable increases in software development, testing,
and verification requirements, and increase requirements for onboard computing resources and
computer memory.
As we’ve noted, designers are facing strong pressures to keep the software and hardware
requirements associated with next-generation vehicles to a minimum. Since the transition to soft
cockpit interfaces is virtually mandated, so are the additional software and hardware
requirements that accompany them. However, any effort to improve fault management
performance with additional forms of automation, that require additional software, will be
scrutinized very carefully, with the bar set quite high for acceptance.
1.3. Additional Opportunities
In fact, operational elements that might benefit from additional automation are not hard to
identify. In their assessment of cockpit-related problems with current shuttle operations, CAU
team members called out the confusing and overwhelming nature of the C&W events as one of
the biggest human factors problems with the cockpit. Accordingly, a team of C&W system
experts developed an enhanced caution and warning (ECW) system that applied straightforward
“rules of thumb” to the fault messages generated by the C&W system in order to identify the
message most closely associated with the parent malfunction. Combined with a well thought-out
concept for crew-ECW interfaces (such as a scheme to suppress “daughter” fault messages and
other alerts), the automated fault diagnosis capability of ECW held great promise for improving
both the efficiency and the accuracy of fault diagnoses on shuttle, over and above the
improvements associated with the redesigned CAU display formats alone. However, the ECW
system was never implemented, even in ground-based shuttle simulators, and was therefore not
included in the ground-based CAU evaluation. Although hard numbers on the operational
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benefits associated with automating the fault diagnosis process were never obtained, an advanced
C&W system with automated diagnostic capability is clearly one of the top candidates for Orion.
The other obvious candidates for targeted automation are operations that can benefit from the
fact that, for the first time, all forms of fault management information will be represented
electronically. Electronic representation provides designers with an opportunity to engineer a
functionally integrated software architecture that automates the process of accessing and
bringing up needed fault management-related forms of information. A specific example from
modern glass-cockpit aircraft is as follows. In most cases, the fault messages in the C&W
system database are isomorphic with the off-nominal checklist titles in the paper ascent/entry
systems procedures flight data file. To select the correct checklist of off-nominal procedures,
operators must match their choice of the proximal-cause fault message to the corresponding title
in the appropriate cue card or flight data file. Just as it still is on shuttle, this activity used to be
quite manually intensive, often involving flipping through several pages of checklists before
locating the matching title. By functionally linking the electronic
 database of fault messages
with the electronic database of EPV checklists, however, designers of the B777 enabled
operators bring up the target off-nominal checklist by simply selecting (clicking on) their choice
of proximal-cause fault message from the list generated by the C&W system.
1.4. Problem Statement
Fault management operations on Orion stand to benefit greatly from the full suit of modern
electronic crew-vehicle interfaces. Additional benefits may be achieved with investments in
targeted forms of fault-management automation, such as an advanced C&W system with
automated fault diagnosis capabilities and a unified avionics system that functionally links
historically isolated repositories of fault management information. However, these investments
would impact software development, testing, and verification schedules, requirements for
onboard computing hardware, and vehicle weight. The outstanding question is whether the
operational enhancements that accompany these investments are sufficient to justify the cost,
schedule, and weight-related impacts. In order to make that determination, vehicle designers
must have quantitative measures of the operational benefits that accompany the automation.
Such metrics are not available from previous studies. The appropriate baseline against which to
assess automation benefits must include a full suite of electronic interfaces, which the CAU
upgrade evaluation did not include. What is needed is a direct, quantitative comparison of fault
management between two operations concepts, both of which employ a full suite of soft crew-
vehicle interfaces, but only one of which includes the additional sources of targeted automation.
1.5. The Present Study
In a preliminary effort to assess these impacts, we recently completed a human factors evaluation
of two fault management concepts for next-generation spacecraft in the Intelligent Spacecraft
Interface Systems (ISIS) Lab. The less computationally demanding concept, called Elsie,
coupled a full suite of next-generation “soft” (electronic) interfaces, including an EPV, with a
“bare-bones” avionics architecture featuring a stand-alone caution and warning (C&W) system
patterned after the current C&W system on shuttle.
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Elsie’s electronic interfaces incorporated many features designed to streamline and enhance fault
management activities, most of which are not available on hard paper checklists and physical
switch panels. However, Elsie’s shuttle-like C&W system featured very limited capabilities and
had no links to other sources of fault-management information. These limitations established
Elsie as representative of a next -generation fault-management concept with minimal software
development, testing, integration, and certification requirements and minimal onboard hardware
requirements. In return, however, Elsie retained many of the same fault management difficulties
that operators encounter on shuttle. Elsie’s C&W system typically generated a confusing
cascade of alarms, fault messages, and off-nominal parameter indications in response to a
malfunction. Operators were forced to work through these symptoms to diagnose the parent
(“proximal cause”) of the C&W event, a time consuming and error prone activity for even very
highly trained individuals. In addition, the lack of any avionics integration forced crewmembers
to access needed information, such as the checklists of fault management proc dures, via look-up
menus. Notably, this method of checklist retrieval may represent a hidden cost of going
electronic compared to shuttle, where cue cards containing the checklists for the most critical
ascent and entry malfunctions are velcroed to the cockpit, rendering them easily available to
operators without having to flip through pages of flight data files. In Elsie, on the other hand,
operators had to manually navigate through an electronic menu of checklist titles to locate and
reach all checklists.
Elsie provided an appropriate baseline condition against which to quantify the performance
benefits that would accompany our second, more advanced concept, called “Besi”. Besi boasted
a more capable C&W system than Elsie, complete with automated proximal (root) cause
diagnoses for C&W system events. In addition, in Besi, the failure messages generated by the
C&W system were dynamically linked to the EPV database of off-nominal checklist titles. This
linkage allowed operators to bypass the process of navigating through EPV menus to bring up
the target checklist. Instead, operators had the option of bringing up a procedures checklist by
simply selecting the fault message selected by the C&W system as the proximal cause of the
C&W event.
Our empirical evaluation compared operators’ performance with Elsie and Besi over a series of
simulated Orion ascents. Each ascent included one or two independent malfunctions in a
simulated electrical power system (EPS) modeled after the Advanced Diagnostics And
Prognostics Technologies (ADAPT) hardware testbed at NASA Ames Research Center (Poll,
Patterson-Hine, Camisa, Garcia, Hall, Lee, Mengshoel, Neukom, Nishikawa, Ossenfort, Sweet,
Yentus, Roychoudhury, Daigle, Biswas, and Koutsoukos, 2007; see Hayashi et. al., 2007, for
additional details). Operators had to detect, diagnose, and respond to the malfunctions by
selecting and completing the appropriate checklist of fault isolation and recovery procedures.
Along with these fault management activities, operators were responsible for detecting
occasional changes in the display color of one of a key set of PFD flight parameters, such as the
g-meter, thrust indicator, or vehicle velocity. Upon noticing a color change, the task was to
reach out and physically touch the PFD parameter exhibiting the color change, and verbally
annunciate that parameter’s name. By including this continuous monitoring task, we were able
to evaluate Elsi/Bessi performance differences in a multitasking environment commensurate with
the environment facing vehicle operators during dynamic phases of spacecraft flight.
13 of 57
The previous report on this study (Hayashi et al., 2007) summarized the results of the evaluation
on a standard suite of human factors performance metrics, such as the accuracy with which
operators diagnosed the parent of a C&W event, the time they took to complete critical sub
elements of the fault management process, and their subjective workload ratings. As expected,
Besi typically supported better performance on these measures. On some malfunctions, Besi
reduced diagnosis time from over 40 seconds to less than 25 seconds. Besi also supported
significantly more accurate fault management performance (an amalgamation of diagnosis and
procedures completion accuracy) on multi-malfunction trials, when the information processing
demands on the operator were highest. Compared to Elsie, Besi yielded lower subjective
workload ratings, more so on multi-malfunction trials than on single malfunction trials. That is,
the higher the fault-management-related workload on the operators, the more benefit Besi
provided.
Last but not least, there were preliminary indications that Besi supported a more effective
division of operators’ attention across the fault management task and PFD-based color detection
task. During the time that operators were actively working a malfunction, they failed to respond
to 30 color changes on the PFD while working malfunctions with Elsie. They missed only three
color changes with Besi.
1.5.1. Limitations of Traditional Measures
Human factors evaluations of spacecraft operational concepts are typically performed after the
operations concept (and associated interfaces) is relatively mature, often to determine whether
the concept meets top-down guidelines for aggregate measures of performance such as workload
and error rate. From the perspective of a spacecraft designer, however, a much more valuable
evaluation product would be a set of specific guidelines and recommendations for the design of
an operational concept and its supporting interfaces. Such guidance requires a more fine -grained
analysis of operators’ information acquisition strategies and display format usage than traditional
measures of performance are able to provide. What displays caused the operators the most
trouble, in terms of time? What forms of automation in Besi were the most germane to
producing the aggregate performance benefits? What forms of automation produced the most
benefit for the least software requirements delta?
This point is worth expanding. In the multi-tasking environment of a spacecraft cockpit during
dynamic flight, many sources of information compete for the operator’s attention.
Understanding how (and for how long) the operator focuses his or her attention on a particular
source can provide important guidance for designers. For example, if a source is available but
ignored, either the operators aren’t following the designer’s model for how they would perform
the task, or the information source is fully redundant with other sources, which operators prefer
to use.
In the case of displays that are forced to time -share display real estate, for example, an upper
limit on how long a display was available for viewing is available from time stamps of display-
navigation-related button presses, which lock in when one display was swapped out in favor of
another. However, such results aren’t definitive, as it’s not clear how much time the operator was
actually viewing that display, as opposed to other regions of interest simultaneously available.
14 of 57
Precise measurements of the proportion of time that a particular information source was being
consulted are available only through analyses of operators’ oculomotor behavior (eye
movements).
Accordingly, throughout each simulated ascent, operator’s eye movements were recorded
continuously by an ISCAN eye-tracking system. Considerable post-processing was necessary to
analyze and interpret eye movement data (see Section 2 below), and most of this activity was
outside the short time frame required to produce the earlier report. A cursory analysis of eye
movement data did, however, suggest a preliminary connection between the number of missed
color changes on the PFD, and operator’s
 scanning behavior. The display was split into upper
(PFD) and lower (malfunction handling) regions, and the percentage of time observers spent
looking at the PFD versus the lower fault management region was calculated during each active
malfunction-handling period. The results showed that operators looked at the PFD approximately
30% of the time when working malfunctions with Besi, compared to 24% with Elsie. This
difference was statistically significant.
Once the oculomotor data were processed appropriately, the actual spatial resolution obtained
supported a division of the lower (fault management) display region into several functionally
distinct sub regions. Analyses of operators’ information acquisition activity with respect to these
sub regions form the basis of the rest of this report.
2. Methodology
2.1. Simulator Facility
The experiment was conducted in the CEV Orion simulator at the Intelligent Spacecraft Interface
Systems (ISIS) laboratory at NASA Ames Research Center (Figure 2-1). The top half of the 20-
inch touch-sensitive monitor on the left side displayed the Primary Flight Display (PFD), and the
bottom half presented the ACAWS display. (The monitor on the right side was not used in this
study.) The operators used the Nostromo hand controller (Figure 2-2) with an orange button to
silence alarms, a castle switch to control and move cursor focus, and a “select button” to click on
selectable display elements, such as edge key labels. A speaker system was installed in the
simulator room to provide spacecraft engine noise and auditory alarms. Throughout the study,
operators wore a baseball cap outfitted with an eye-tracking system (ISCAN ETL-500 eye
tracker integrated with Polhemus FasTRAK head tracker), which computed the participant’s
gaze point on the monitor with up to 60 Hz of temporal resolution, and approximately 0.5 inch of
spatial resolution.
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2.1.1. Displays and Procedures
The following sections describe and explain the Elsie and Besi fault management concepts. In
general, Elsie was more similar to shuttle in terms of the level of automation assistance with fault
management operations, with exceptions of the electronic switches and EPV, while Besi
Figure 2-1. CEV Orion Simulator
Figure 2-2. Nostromo Hand Controller
provided additional forms of automated assistance. Display formats relating to the electrical
power system (EPS) and the PFD were developed specifically for this study, while the other
displays were quite similar to display formats developed as part of the CAU project.
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2.2. Elsie
Figure 2-3 shows the fault management interfaces for Elsie. The interface consisted of three sub
regions: the Main Area, the Checklist Area, and the Fault Message Area. In Figure 2-3, the Main
Area is showing the EPS Summary (EPS Sum) display, a line-diagra m of the EPS. The main
concept behind the Elsie design was to show the crew detailed system information so that s/he
could make informed diagnosis of the proximal cause of C&W events. System information was
provided on several Main Area displays: EPS Sum, which showed the EPS line-diagram (Figure
2-3); EPS Main, which provided all available EPS parameters in a table format (Figure 2-4), and
EPS Loads, which indicated the status of the load switches in a table format (Figure 2-5). All
ECLSS parameters were presented in the ECLSS display (Figure 2-6). These displays all
appeared in the Main Area and could be called up via dedicated edge key labels along the top of
the screen. The virtual switch panels (Figure 2-7 shows an example) were also presented in the
Main Area
	 Checklist Area
Fault Message Area
Figure 2-3. Elsie
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Main Area, and the green box (cursor focus area) could be moved among the switch icons
(Figure 2-7).
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Figure 2-5. Elsie - EPS Loads
Figure 2-6. Elsie - ECLSS
Figure 2-4. Elsie - EPS Main
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Figure 2-8. Elsie - Fault Sum
Figure 2-9. Elsie - Fault Log
Figure 2-7. Elsie - EPS Distribution Switch Panel
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Two additional displays that could be selected and viewed in the Main Area were the Fault
Summary display (Fault Sum; Figure 2-8) and Fault Log (Figure 2-9), which contained the full
list of fault messages generated by the C&W system. The typical fault management process
unfolded as follows. Prior to the insertion of a systems malfunction, participants were instructed
to divide their attention between Fault Sum, which was the default display for the Main Area,
and the PFD. Fault Sum was designed to provide “at a glance” health status of the EPS and
ECLSS systems. When a malfunction occurred, the C&W system responded with cockpit
indicators that collectively formed the C&W event: a visual alarm (the red Master Alarm edge
key label at the lower left of Figure 2-3); an auditory alarm; changes in the display color of the
values and symbols associated with the affected component(s) on Fault Sum (yellow for caution
[affecting non-critical loads], red for warning [affecting critical loads]); and up to five color-
coded fault messages in the lower Message Area. Operators were instructed to start utilizing the
color-coding pattern on Fault Sum to assess whi ch system, EPS or ECLSS, was likely to contain
the proximal cause of the C&W event. They were then encouraged (though this was optional), to
check the EPS Sum display (if the suspected component was in EPS) or the ECLSS display (if it
was in ECLSS) to further evaluate which specific component represented the most likely
proximal-cause failure.
In addition to these graphical displays, the fault messages issued by the C&W system provided
an additional and important source of diagnostic information. For its part, the Message Area had
room enough to display only the last five messages generated (i.e., the fault message area was
populated on a on a “last-in” basis)
 . If (as was typically the case) the fault generated more than
five messages, the operator could only view the full set by bringing up the Fault Log display
(Figure 2-9) in the Main Area. Fault Log had three pages, each of which could list up to
eighteen messages, or 54 in total, in chronological order (with the most recently generated
[newest] message at the top). As a “rule -of-thumb” for diagnosing the parent malfunction,
operators were instructed to look for any “switch mismatch” fault message (i.e., the commanded
position and sensed position of the switch were in disagreement
 ). If there was no such message,
operators were instructed to then search for a volts-related message from the most upstream
component of the EPS/ECLSS hierarchy .
Fault messages also played a pivotal role in the second phase of the fault management operations,
labeled C1, which was to navigate to and bring up the appropriate checklist in the EPV.
Critically, the labels populating the menus of EPS checklists were identical to a C&W fault
messages. In the case of Elsie, therefore, operators had to first select the one message judged to
correspond to the proximal cause of the C&W event, and then match that message to an entry in
the EPV menu.
Once the diagnosis was completed, the next step was to locate (navigate to) and select the
corresponding label from the menu of EPS malfunction checklists in the EPV (see below).
Functionally, the operator accomplished these activities by moving the cursor focus to the
Checklist Index edge key label, in the lower right corner, and selecting (clicking on) it. Clicking
Checklist Index brought up the menu of EPS failure checklists in the EPV area (in practice, it
was not uncommon for a participant to bring up the checklist menu before making a final
selection from the fault log messages, suggesting operators sometimes engaged in a pattern-
matching activity between fault messages and checklist labels which may have helped them with
the diagnosis itself). Then, the operator manually navigated to the target checklist label and
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selected it, thereby bringing up the target checklist on the EPV. Once the target checklist was
accessed, operators used edge key labels on the right side of the fault management display to
navigate through (and complete) the individual procedures (lines).
In summary, these message-related activities in Elsie were broader similar to Shuttle fault
management activities except that, on shuttle, individual checklists are static paper entities.
Compared to paper, the EPV contained multiple display features to assist with checklist
navigation, such as highlighting the current “focus” line with a blue bar, coding already
completed procedures by reducing their brightness and positioning them above the current focus
line, and automatically skipping lines belonging to branches rendered irrelevant by conditional
logic (e.g., if... then... else statements).
2.3. Besi
Figure 2-10 shows the fault management interfaces for Besi. Besi contains five areas: the Main
Area, the Checklist Area, the System Status Area, the Root Cause Area, and the Fault Message
Area. In Figure 2-10, the Main Area is displaying Besi’s version of the EPS display. Although
the performance impacts are not the focus of this report, in Besi, mode reconfiguration
capabilities were embedded in the EPS Sum display itself. When the checklist called for a
switch throw, the participant moved the cursor directly to the switch symbol within the line-
diagram of the EPS display and toggled the switch state. Since there was no separate virtual
switch panel that had to share the same display real estate as the system summary displays (as in
Elsie), in Besi, the impacts of a switch throw to the system was immediately visible to the
operator.
Besi was designed with three principles in mind:
1. Provide an interface with a model-based reasoner called the Hybrid Diagnostic Engine
(HyDE), an ADAPT inference engine that diagnosed the parent of a C&W system event.
2. Provide more automated assistance with information navigation and information retrieval.
3. Lessen the information-processing load on the operator by automatically suppressing details
deemed less relevant to the current operation. The suppressed details were still accessible to the
operator by extra commands. For example, Besi’s EPS Summary display (Figure 2-10) utilized
more graphical representations than Elsie’s. The default EPS display in Besi provided graphical
representations for voltage (V), current (A), and battery temperature (T) for all active elements
(see Figure 2-10). The height of the fills indicated the sensor readings, with C&W limits marked
by red ticks, but no numerical data were presented by default. If a participant wished to view
numerical values, s/he could bring them up by selecting the View edge key at the upper-left
corner and then selecting the #s: all option in a pull-down menu. Then, the numbers appeared
under the corresponding graphics. Also, Besi’s EPS display automatically suppressed lines
connecting inactive components to reduce display clutter. A participant could see the suppressed
lines by, again, selecting the View edge key, and then selecting the conn: all option from the
menu.
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Main Area	 Checklist Area
Figure 2-10. Besi.
Below Besi’s Main Area were, from left to right, the System Status Area, the Root Cause Area,
and the Fault Message Area. The matrix in the System Status Area remained dark gray if no out-
of-limit sensor readings were detected. When any abnormal readings were sensed, the name of
the system containing a problem showed up in yellow (caution) or red (warning) and the number
of caution and warning messages was displayed. Thus, the System Status Area provided an at-a-
glance indication of overall systems health. Also, moving the cursor to the SUMM, EPS, or
ECLSS cell in the System Status matrix and selecting it brought up the Fault Sum, EPS, or
ECLSS display, respectively. The Fault Sum and ECLSS display designs were common in Elsie
and Besi (Figures 2-6 and 2-8). The Root Cause Area presented the proximal cause fault
message as determined by HyDE. The adjacent Fault Message Area functioned in the same way
as it did in Elsie. The Fault Log displays were also accesse d via the edge key just like in Elsie.
The electronic checklists were viewed in the Checklist Area on the right side of the Main Area.
The Master Alarm edge key was at the top of the display.
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A typical fault management process in Besi was as follows. As in Elsie trials, operators started
out monitoring the Fault Sum and PFD displays. As soon as a malfunction was inserted, color
changes for out-of-limits parameters appeared on Fault Sum (yellow for caution, red for
warning) and fault messages appeared in the Fault Message Area; the Master Alarm was not yet
issued. It usually took five to seven seconds for HyDE to complete its root-cause diagnosis.
During this period, it was recommended, though optional, that operators check the Fault Sum
display, and then either the EPS or the ECLSS display as appropriate, to examine which specific
component(s) and sensor values were off nominal. Once HyDE completed the diagnosis, the
fault message corresponding most closely to the proximal cause appeared in the Root Cause Area,
and the Master Alarm was issued to draw the operators’ attention.
In Besi, operators did not have to manually navigate to the target checklist by navigating through
EPV menus. If they agreed with HyDE’s proximal cause diagnosis, they would simply navigate
to and click on Besi’s Root Cause Select edge key label. This operation transferred cursor focus
to the message that corresponded to the proximal cause fault message in the Root Cause Area. In
turn, clicking on (selecting) this message immediately brought up the corresponding checklist in
the EPV. Subsequent navigation through the checklist was done in an analogous way to Elsie,
using the edge key labels on the right-hand side of the fault management display.
The content of the checklists for the same proximal cause were often different for Elsie and Besi,
because HyDE automated many verification steps. Thus, instead of the lengthy diagnosing steps
typically seen in the Elsie checklists, the Besi checklists often contained only a single
verification step (e.g., Ò Load A volts low”) to make sure that HyDE’s computation was
consistent with the operator’s evaluation of the situation.
2.4. PFD Monitoring Task
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A PFD monitoring task was also included to assess operators’ ability to divide their attention
between fault management activities and the more general flight monitoring activities that go on
during ascent. The PFD, displayed in the top half of the 20-inch (portrait-orientation) monitor,
included five flight parameters: altitude, velocity, G-meter, vehicle position, and thrust (see
Figure 2-11). Each trial started with a simulated liftoff of the vehicle. Every 20 seconds (on
average) the interior of one of the white background areas that housed critical flight parameters
on the PFD changed to yellow. If the operator took no action, then after five seconds elapsed,
the area changed from yellow to red. The area remained red for an additional five seconds and
then, if the operator had still taken no action, returned to white. If, instead, the operator noticed
the color change, he or she was trained to reach up and touch the indicator position directly while
calling out its name (for example, if the G-meter box changed color, they would call out “G-
meter”). Touching the colored parameter returned its area color to white immediately.
The operators were instructed to give equal importance to the PFD monitoring task and the fault
management task, i.e. not to ignore the one in favor of the other. Nevertheless, humans are
notorious for their limited ability to divide their attention between multiple simultaneous tasks.
Our primary interest was in how the demands of the fault management task would impact PFD
monitoring task performance. To the extent that the fault management (lower) display captured
Position	 Velocity	 Altitude
Thrust
	
	 G-meter
Figure 2-11. PFD
visual attention, for example, we would expect observes to be either slower to notice and respond
to a color change on the PFD, or to miss color changes altogether. In fact, as described in the
earlier report, operators did fail to notice significantly more color changes when working
malfunctions with the less automated Elsie than with Besi. This result was supported by a
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preliminary analysis, which revealed that operators spent a greater proportion of time looking at
the PFD while working malfunctions with Elsie than with Besi.
Clearly, Besi reduced visual tunneling on the fault management displays. However, just how our
operators implemented this reduction could not be ascertained from the rather coarse analyses in
the earlier report. In any multi-tasking environment, where the information associated with the
constituent tasks is located in discrete visual locations, operators must develop and implement a
strategy for how to distribute and coordinate their information acquisition activities across time.
How often does one task get interrupted to service the other? What determines when an interrupt
decision was made? Does it depend on the particulars of what is being processed “at the
moment”, or does it reflect a top-down strategy that was invariant with respect to moment-by
moment activities and demands? The new and much more fine-grained analyses of eye
movement behavior reported here allow us to begin to address these issues.
2.4.1. Operators
Eight operators, all instrument-rated pilots, were recruited for the study. The operators included
seven males and one female, and their ages ranged from 24 to 54 (average of 37.5). Their total
flight times ranged from 230 to 21000 hours, and the instrument-flight times ranged from 68 to
2000 hours. All operators were right-handed and had normal or corrected vision (i.e., 20/40 or
better). Each operator received approximately twelve hours of training, including four hours of
reading assignment
 s, four hours of classroom lecture, and four hours of hands-on practice
working EPS and ECLSS systems malfunctions using a laptop-computer-based trainer. Each
operator was required to pass a final exam immediately prior to his or her first data-collection
session.
2.4.2. Data Collection
Data collection was split into two sessions. Each session consisted of seven simulated ascents
with one display format suite (either Elsie or Besi). Half of the operators completed seven Elsie
trials in the first session followed by seven Besi trials in the second session. For the other half,
the session order was reversed. Scenario orders were counterbalanced across participants.
Table 2-1 lists the fourteen malfunction scenarios used. Scenario pairs #5 and #6, #7 and #8, #9
and #10, and #13 and #14 were symmetric, and used in the different ACAWS displays within a
participant. For instance, a participant who was assigned scenario #5 for Elsie was assigned
scenario #6 for Besi, or vice versa. Scenarios #11 and #12 were identical. Scenarios #3, #4, and
#11 through #14 contained multiple malfunctions. In these scenarios, the second malfunction
occurred 55 to 90 seconds after the occurrence of the first malfunction so that the participant was
still working on the first malfunction when the second one occurred.
Scenarios #1 through #4 formed one group that provided 2 x 2 conditions, real failure vs. sensor
failure (see Hayashi et al., 2007 for details) and single malfunction (lower workload) vs. multiple
malfunctions (higher workload). The switch sensor failures in #2 and #3 caused a false alarm
when the switch was actually functioning correctly. For the Besi trials, the sensor failure also
caused HyDE to misdiagnose and generate a root cause that did not exist (the original HyDE
algorithms were able to distinguish sensor failures from actual component failures, but for this
study, HyDE was intentionally modified to generate a false root cause in these particular cases so
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that the participants’ responses to an inappropriate diagnosis could be studied.) Due to the
different experiment designs, scenarios #1 through #4 were analyzed separately from the rest of
the scenarios.
Each trial started from liftoff and ended at eight, ten, or twelve minutes into flight, whichever cut
off came first after the operator completed the malfunction resolution. If the operator was unable
to resolve the malfunction, the trial was ended at twelve minutes. During the trials, operators’
ACAWS display commands (edge key navigations, checklist navigations, switch throws, etc.)
were recorded and time stamped. Likewise, operators’ touches of the PFD were recorded. All
trials were video recorded.
Table2-1. Malfunction Scenarios
Scenario # Malfunction(s)
1 A/L1 sw mismatch
2 B/L1 sw mismatch (false alarm)
3* 1) Load B sw mismatch (restorable)
2) A/L2 sw mismatch (false alarm)
4*
1) Load A sw mismatch (restorable)
2) B/L2 sw mismatch
5 DistAA sw mismatch (restorable)
6 DistBB sw mismatch (restorable)
7 Battery A volts low
8 Battery B volts low
9 Inverter A failure
10 Inverter B failure
11*
1) Inverter A failure
2) Battery A volts low
12* Same as 11
13* 1) Battery A volts low
2) Battery B volts low
14*
1) Battery B volts low
2) Battery A volts low
* : Multiple-malfunction scenarios
Immediately after each trial, questionnaires for TLX (Hart & Staveland, 1988) and modified
Bedford (Roscoe, 1984; Huntley, 1993) workload scales were administered via a computer
interface. Following the 7th and 14th trials (i.e., at the end of each session), operators provided
their TLX pairwise comparisons via an electronic questionnaire. After completing both sessions,
they provided written answers to questions regarding display usage, display preference, and user
interface design.
27 of 57
2.5. Summary of Previously Reported Findings
The major findings from the previous report are as follows.
Table 2-2 summarizes the performance accuracy grading results for Elsie and Besi for each
scenario. The trials were graded Correct if all proper checklists were used AND all switch
throws were performed correctly. Trials where some or all of the proper checklists wer e not
used or the final switch configuration was incorrect were graded Failed. All other trials (i.e.,
all proper checklists used and final switch configurations correct, but some improper switch
throw(s) occurred during the process) were graded Good. Besi trials resulted in more
Correct and Good performances combined (i.e., non-Failed performances) and less Failed
performances than Elsie trials (both trends were statistically significant).
Table 2-2. Malfunction Management Procedure Accuracy by Scenario
Elsie Besi
Correct Good Failed Correct Good FailedScenario # Malfunction(s)
1 A/L1 sw mismatch 2 1 1 3 1 0
2 B/L1 sw mismatch (sensor failure) 3 0 1 3 1 0
3* 1) Load B sw mismatch (restorable) 1 0 3 3 0 12) A/L2 sw mismatch (sensor failure)
4* 1) Load A sw mismatch (restorable) 3 0 1 4 0 02) B/L2 sw mismatch
5 DistAA sw mismatch (restorable) 4 0 0 4 0 0
6 DistBB sw mismatch (restorable) 4 0 0 4 0 0
7 Battery A volts low 3 0 1 3 0 1
8 Battery B volts low 4 0 0 3 0 1
9 Inverter A failure 4 0 0 3 0 1
10 Inverter B failure 4 0 0 4 0 0
11* 1)	 Inverter	 A	 failure 2 0 2 2 2 02) Battery A volts low
12* Same as 11 0 2 2 1 0 3
13* 1)	 Battery 	 A	 volts	 low 2 0 2 4 0 02) Battery B volts low
14* 1)	 Battery 	 B	 volts	 low 0 2 2 2 2 02) Battery A volts low
Total 36 5 15 43 6 7
* : Multiple-malfunction scenarios
n The malfunction resolution times (RT) for the single-malfunction scenarios (#5 through #10)
showed that Besi significantly shortened the RTs for scenarios #5/#6 and #9/#10. Further
analyses on different phases within the RTs indicated that Besi significantly shortened the
time spent for initial diagnosis.
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n Analyses of the PFD color-change monitoring task during the on-task time (the time during
which the participant was working on a malfunction) indicated that Elsie trials tended to
result in more task misses than Besi trials. The results provide preliminary evidence that
attentional tunneling on the malfunction procedures was more severe in Elsie trials than Besi
trials.
n Preliminary eye-movement analysis based on a coarse parsing of the display into two regions
– the upper PFD and the lower fault management area - revealed that the operators monitored
the PFD for 23.9% of the total on-task time in Elsie trials, versus 30.5% in Besi trials. The
difference was statistically significant.
n Both NASA TLX workload scores and the modified Bedford workload scores for the paired
scenarios (#5 through #14) showed that participants experienced significantly less workload
with Besi than with Elsie.
n Operators preferred Besi significantly more than Elsie for the diagnostic process and the
recovery process. They also preferred Besi’s switch symbol representation significantly over
Elsie’s virtual switch panel representation. They marginally preferred Besi’s graphical
representation of parameter values over Elsie’s textual parameter representation.
2.6. Focus of the Present Report
Many issues concerning display usage and information acquisition strategies cannot be answered
with these conventional human factors performance measures. In this report, we provide more
fine-grained analyses of oculomotor behavior that enable a more direct assessment of operators’
information acquisition strategies and display usage patterns. The results provide clearer
guidance for the design of fault management displays and a better understanding of the impacts
of the various forms of Elsie automation.
While some of the new analyses encompassed all phases of the fault management task, our
primary focus is on the diagnostic and checklist selection phases, as these provided the most
direct assessment of the impact of automating the proximal-cause diagnosis and checklist
retrieval operations. To provide the appropriate context for these analyses, we will first make
more explicit some of the links between the information display requirements of our multi-
tasking environment and our display layout and display navigation schemes.
2.6.1. Display Real Estate and Display Availability
Prior to the insertion of a malfunction, the operator’s tasks were to monitor vehicle flight status
information, detect and respond to color changes on PFD flight parameters, and monitor systems
operations for any operational anomalies. The information display requirements for this mix of
tasks were fully satisfied by the PFD and Fault Sum displays. As soon as a malfunction occurred,
the multi-tasking demands on the operator increased, as did the requirements for information
display. For example, in Elsie, operators were required to make a proximal-cause diagnosis of
the off-nominal event, and were trained to utilize information from several sources to support
their proximal-cause fault diagnosis. Due to display real estate limitations, some of these sources
could be viewed simultaneously, others only sequentially. Figure 2-12 illustrates the suggested
time course of display usage in Elsie and Besi, as per the training regimen, for display formats
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that could only be viewed sequentially. In both operational concepts, operators were trained to
first utilize the Fault Sum display, which always occupied the main display area at the time the
malfunction(s) occurred. As shown in Figure 2-12, operators were trained to acquire further
insight from the EPS graphical displays (EPS Sum or EPS Main in Elsie; EPS in Besi).
At this point, the information requirements for Elsie and Besi started to deviate. In Elsie, the
proximal-cause diagnosis amounted to selecting a C&W fault message, as these messages did
“double duty” as labels for the off-nominal EPV checklists. Thus, operators generally had to
replace the EPS displays in the Main Display Region with the C&W Fault Log page (only two
scenarios contained the parent fault message in the list of messages in the fault message region).
By contrast, Besi provided a candidate proximal-cause fault message, and the act of selecting
that message brought up the corresponding EPV checklist automatically. As a result, bringing up
the Fault Log page was virtually unnecessary in Elsie.
One source of fault-management information, the subset of fault messages presented in the lower
message area, was always in view. Thus, there were always at least three sources of task-
relevant information available for viewing at any one time: the PFD (for the color-change task),
and for the fault-management task, any one of a number of graphical fault-management related
displays in the main display area, and the fault messages in the lower C&W message area. If we
also include the edge key labels used for display navigation and display selection, there were
actually four distinct regions competing for operator’s attention. How operators coordinated and
scheduled information acquisition activities between these regions is a major focus of this report.
The results are relevant to several fundamental issues relating to fault management operational
concept definition and interface design.
2.6.2. Display Usage: Where did the time go?
Although the architecture of our display navigation scheme forced strictly sequential processing
of Fault Sum, EPS summary displays, and Fault Log, the precise amount of time spent looking at
these displays was entirely at the operators’ discretion. With multiple areas simultaneously
competing for attention, an objective measure, such as the time stamps of the edge key presses
that swapped out these displays, does not provide a definite measure of actual time-on-display.
Only analyses of eye fixations can determine how much use operators made of these multiple
sources of information, most notably the textual information provided by the fault messages,
compared to the more graphical information provided by the Fault Sum, EPS Sum (Elsie) or EPS
(Besi) displays. Of the total time taken to diagnose the malfunction, what proportion was
devoted to each information source?
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Figure 2-12. Display Usage Flow during Initial Diagnosis
2.6.3. Information Acquisition Strategies and Display Real Estate Requirements
In next generation spacecraft, checklists of off-nominal procedures will migrate from paper to an
EPV. In addition, since there will be little or no display of C&W system information on
dedicated hardware panels (such as panel F7 on the shuttle); virtually all C&W information will
be depicted electronically. The net increase in demand for electronic real estate to support real-
time fault management operations will have to be accommodated within a cockpit with much
less display real estate available than the shuttle. That supply will be further restricted during the
dynamic flight phases, when the crew will need continuous access to GNC and safety-critical
systems summary displays (such as the main propulsion system summary display). Thus, the
identification of the minimal display real estate requirements necessary to support fast and
accurate fault management operations is a critical issue.
When a display environment presents the operator with multiple distinct sources of task-relevant
information, as was the case with our operational concepts, the operator has considerable leeway
as to how he or she organizes, coordinates, and sequences individual information acquisition
events (IAEs) from each source. Analyses of these strategies offers preliminary guidance for
how much (or what forms of) fault management information should be provided simultaneously,
and what forms might safely share a single region of display real estate (and therefore not
available for simultaneous viewing), without compromising task performance.
As we noted, in our display configurations, there were at least two sources of fault -related
information available at all times. Importantly, the information in these sources remained the
same throughout the diagnosis phase of the fault management process (D1). Since the
information content was static, two information acquisition strategies were possible (Droll,
Hayhoe, Treisch, & Sullivan, 2005; Droll and Hayhoe, 2007). One strategy would be to select
(fixate on) a display region and fully encode all the task-relevant information from that
information source into working memory in the single IAE. This would be revealed by the
existence of an initial IAE to each relevant region, and few or no follow-ups.
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On the one hand, this “all-in-one” encoding strategy would place high demands on working
memory resources; for example, if the diagnostic process was supported by cross-checking
information from the multiple displays with relevant information (such as, for example, the EPS
system summary displays and the fault messages in the fault message area), this cross checking
would entail comparing information extracted from the current IAE (on the currently attended
ROI) with information stored in working memory from the previously attended areas. On the
other hand, “all-in-one”
 encoding would minimize eye movements and the accompanying need
for scheduling and executing saccades, behaviors that have been inferred to contribute to
operator workload (Drol l et al., 2005). In addition, comparing information extracted from a
current IAE with information from memory might be more efficient than cross-checking with a
visual source, as that information has to be re-attended and re-encoded. These steps are
obviously eliminated when the information is available in memory.
The alternative strategy would be to minimize the demands on working memory by acquiring
information from available sources in a more incremental fashion, across several distinct IAEs,
separated by IAEs to other regions of interest. For example, following Droll and Hayhoe (2007),
operators might choose to relieve the working memory load by encoding only a subset of the
total information available in a particular region of interest on any particular fixation. They
might then have to cross-check new information, acquired during the current IAE, against
information in the other region that was not relevant when they visited it earlier, and had
therefore not been encoded. This strategy would be revealed by the presence of multiple IAE’s
to the same “region of interest” (ROI) (of course, this strategy might simply be mandated by
limitations in human working memory resources, or if previously encoded information is subject
to short-term memory decay).
Whether operators do or do not return to ROIs already visited has direct implications for fault
management-related requirements for display real estate. If operators spontaneously adopt the
“full encoding” strategy, and revisit only rarely, the efficiency with which they perform the fault
management task should not be greatly impacted if relevant information sources have to time-
share the same section of display real estate, reducing the overall display real estate requirements
of the fault management task. On the other hand, if revisiting is common, the implication would
be that an environment in which multiple sources of fault management information were
available for viewing simultaneously would better support fault management. This would, of
course, raise the display real estate requirements needed to optimize task performance.
2.6.4. Multi-Tasking Strategies
In our earlier report, we noted that operators missed significantly fewer color changes on their
PFD symbology while working malfunctions with Besi than with Elsie, indicating that Besi
influenced the divided attention strategy between the fault management task and the PFD -based
task. Analyses of eye movements can allow us to distinguish between three more specific
hypotheses. The performance benefit could be due to 1) increased duration of individual PFD
fixations, 2) increased number of IAEs to the PFD per unit time (higher sampling frequency) or
3) both higher sampling frequency and longer durations.
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3. Eye-Movement Data Processing
3.1. Raw Eye-Movement Data
The ISCAN eye-and-head-tracking system measured the head positions (x, y, and z), head
rotations (azimuth, elevation, and roll), pupil center locations (x and y), and corneal reflection
locations (x and y) at the sampling rate of approximately 60 H z. These measurements were used
to compute the participant’s line
 -of-sight eye angles. The 3D coordinates of the four corners of
the computer monitor had been registered in the eye-and-head-tracking system, and with that
information, the ISCAN’s software computed the Plane Intersection Coordinates (PICs), that
were the x-y intersection coordinates on the plane (i.e., the computer monitor surface) at which
the line of sight penetrates the plane. The PICs were computed for each sampling (i.e., approx
60 Hz). These PICs were the starting point of the following eye-movement data analyses, and
are referred to as raw eye-movement data in this report.
Once before and once after each trial, the participants were asked to look at each of the three-by-
six grid reference points for about two seconds each. This process is called external calibration.
The external calibration data were recorded and used for determining the borders between
regions of interest (see Section 3.3).
3.2. Identifying Fixations
The raw eye-movement data included fixations and saccades (rapid eye movements in between
Figure 3-1. Identifying Fixations
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Four ROI
fixations). For the purpose investigating participants’ display usage, first, only the fixation data
points were extracted. The fixation criteria used in this study were as follow s: For successive
data points to be classified as part of the same fixation, they had to be within 0.76 inch both
horizontally and vertically from the centroid of the fixation, and the duration of the data point
had to be 100 msec or longer. The algorithm ignored noises of up to five consecutive samplings.
Any data points that did not satisfy the fixation criteria were considered saccades and removed
from the analysis. Figure 3-1 shows examples of the raw eye-movement data (blue) collected
during a single trial, and their fixation centroids (magenta) superimposed on the raw data.
3.3. Classifying into Regions of Interest
Next, each fixation was classified into one Region of Interest (ROI). The area of the computer
monitor was divided into four primary ROIs, which are PFD, Main, Checklist, and Message
(Figure 3-2). All borders were either horizontal or vertical (i.e., no tilt). The initial positions of
these borders were selected based on the external calibration data, and then the border positions
were fine-tuned around the initial positions so that the numbers of data that the borders crossed
were minimized. Figure 3-2 shows an example ROI classification of the fixations.
Figure 3-2. Classifying into ROI
Note that the ROI corresponding to the main display area contained different displays at different
times. Thus, the Main ROI was further classified into individual displays of Elsie or Besi. Table
3-1 lists the ROIs for Elsie and Besi.
Also note that the Message ROI in the Elsie trials contained the Fault Message Area and the edge
keys located at the bottom of the screen. In the Besi trials, the Message ROI included three areas
at the bottom, which were System Status, Root Cause, and Fault Message Areas, and the edge
keys at the bottom.
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Table 3-1. ROI
Elsie ROI Besi ROI
•
	 PFD •	 PFD
•	 Fault Sum" •	 Fault Sum"
•
	 EPS Displays (combining EPS Sum, EPS Main, •	 EPS"
and EPS Loads displays)"
•	 ECLSS"
•
	 EPS Switch Panels (combining EPS Dist Switch
•	 Fault Log (p.1 - p.3)"
Panel and EPS Loads Switch Panel)"
• Checklist
•	 ECLSS"
•	 Message
•	 Fault Log (combining p.1 through p.3)"
•	 Checklist
•	 Message
" : Main ROI group
Finally, all temporally adjacent fixations within the same ROI were grouped together to form a
single IAE. In other words, each IAE represents one distinct visit to one ROI, and usually
contained multiple fixations. The start time and duration of each IAE were computed, and used
for the analyses.
3.4. Definitions of RT Phases and On-Task Times
Since the study’s major interest was to understand operators’ display usage during the fault
management process, most of the eye-movement data analyses were performed only on the data
during the time the participants were working on a malfunction or malfunctions.
The time from the appearance of the first fault message to the completion of the procedures
checklist is called malfunction resolution time (RT). Strictly speaking, RT was the sum of the
durations of five quasi-distinct phases, namely, Diagnosis 1 (D1), Checklist 1 (C1), Diagnosis 2
(D2), Checklist 2 (C2), and Recovery (R), each of which was associated with tasks of different
natures. Most of the analyses were performed separately for each RT phase. Table 3-2 describes
the five phases.
Computing and comparing the RT phase durations became difficult when the participants
deviated from standard procedures (the trials graded Good or Failed) or interleaved two different
procedures (multiple-malfunction scenarios). For those reasons, the durations of the RT phases
were calculated for only the single-malfunction trials (scenarios #5 through #10) graded Correct
most of the times. The only exceptions were the analyses on the data during D1 (Sections 4.1.1
and 4.3). The reason why all the data, that were the scenarios #5 through #14 trials regardless of
the grade, were included for only the D1 phase was that, unlike during the other phases, defining
errors was not as relevant to the D1 phase. Malfunction performance grading was basically
determined by the switch-throw and checklist-navigation performances; neither of which was a
part of D1. Among the five phases, D1
 was the only phase where the participants used the fault
management displays in a quasi open-loop fashion. Therefore, the D1 phase was particularly
interesting for this study
 ’s purposes, and the exception helped maximize the amount of usable
data.
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Table 3-2. Five phases of RT
Phases Descriptions From To
The operator assessed the situation The first fault Checklist Index edge orDiagnosis 1 and made a root cause Root Cause Select
(D1) determination before selecting the message wasdisplayed . edge key (Besi) was
checklist to go to. selected.
Checklist 1 The operator navigated to the proper
Checklist Index edge
or Root Cause Select The correct checklist
(C1) checklist. This process was manual edge key (Besi) was was displayed.in Elsie, and automated in Besi.
selected.
Completion of the last
line of the diagnosis
The operator followed the checklist steps was
acknowledged, or the
Diagnosis 2 instructions to perform the diagnosis The correct checklist line that instructs
(D2) steps. Besi’s checklists usually was displayed. transitioning to thecontained fewer diagnosis steps than
recovery checklist (ifElsie’s. there is a separate
recovery checklist) was
acknowledged.
The operator navigated to the
recovery checklist. If there was no The line that instructs The correct recoveryChecklist 2 separate recovery checklist, C2 transitioning to the
checklist was(C2) duration was zero. Again, going to recovery checklist displayed.the recovery checklist was manual in was acknowledged.
Elsie and automated in Besi.
Completion of the last
line of the diagnosis Completion of the last
Recovery The operator performed the steps was line of the recovery
(R) instructed switch throws to acknowledged, or the steps wasreconfigure the system for recovery. correct recovery
acknowledged.
checklist was
displayed.
The other concept related to the RT is on-task time. The time between the start of D1 and the end
of R (if it was a multiple-malfunction scenario, the R of the second malfunction) was simply the
time where the participant was working on some aspect of the malfunction management (no
matter what it was). This period will be called on-task time in the following analyses. The on-
task time never had a break, even for the multiple-malfunction trials. The advantage of the on-
task time over the RT phases was that the on-task times could be computed easily even for the
multiple-malfunction trials and the trials graded Good or Failed (as long as there is some marker
that indicates the end of the on-task time). The definitions of the on-task time were somewhat
looser and more relaxed than those of the RT phases, but may be sufficient for certain type of the
analyses, especially when the focus was not the usage of the ACAWS displays themselves. For
instance, most analyses of the PFD task performance (the task concurrent with the ACAWS
malfunction-management tasks) used the on-task time rather than the RT phases.
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4. Results
4.1. Percent Display Usages
4.1.1. Aggregate Display Usage during D1
Figure 4-1 shows the percent usages of the displays participants examined during the D1 phase
of the paired trials (scenarios #5 through #14). All paired
 -trial data, regardless of the number of
malfunctions and their grading, were used for the D1 phase. Note that we used different criteria
for data inclusion from the rest of the RT phases, where data from the only single-malfunction
trials graded Correct was used (See Section 4.4 for the rationale). The total length of each bar
was adjusted to scale with their grand average durations (i.e., 43 sec for Elsie, 24 sec for Besi).
Fault Sum, 9.2%
PFD,	 EPS Fault Log,	 Mssg	 Others,	 AverageElsie
	 18.6%
	
Disps,	 21.8%
	
15.7%	 20.5%	 43 sec
14.2%
Fault Sum, 13.2%F^^ EPS, 13.2%	 Others, 6.0%
Besi	 PFD,	 Message, 	 Average23.0%	 44.6%	 24 sec
10	 15	 20	 25	 30	 35	 40 sec 45
Figure 4-1. Display page usage during D1
The EPS Displays ROI in Elsie included the EPS Sum (11.5%) and the EPS Main (2.4%). No
participant used the EPS Loads during D1 of the Elsie trials. No participant used the ECLSS
display during D1 of these scenarios . The Others category in Elsie included dwells in the
Checklist ROI (6.2%), the system list shown in the Main Area after selecting the System Focus
edge key (5.9%), and a blank screen displayed in the Main Area after selecting EPS in the
system list (3.4%). The “Others” category in Besi included dwells in Fault Log (4.3%) and the
Checklist ROI (0.5%). The Checklist ROI were grouped in the Others category for D1, because
this ROI remained mostly blank during D1, except for the Mission Elapsed Time (MET)
indication in the upper-right corner and the Checklist Index edge key in the lower-right corner.
The remaining percentages of the “Others” category were composed of saccades among the ROI,
or noise.
D1 is the RT phase where the participants diagnosed the malfunction, based partly on
instructions, but largely using strategies of their own choosing. Therefore, their display usage
during D1 was particularly interesting. The Elsie graph reveals that over one third of diagnosis
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time was spent viewing either Fault Log or the Fault Message Area, the two areas that provided
text-based information about the malfunction (note, however, that the Fault Message Area also
included the edge keys; this issue will be revisited in Section 4.3). Similarly, in Besi, the text-
based ROIs (System Status, Root Cause Box, and Fault Message Area) accounted for over 40%
of the total D1 time. Note that this one ROI contained not only Besi’s proximal cause message
in the ACAWS dialog box, and raw (unfiltered) fault messages in the Fault message area, but
also the C& matrix and the edge keys used to navigate among displays in the Main Display Area.
The multiple sources of information may explain why this area received so many fixations
during D1 in Besi .
4.1.2. Percent Display Usages during C1
Figure 4-2 plots the percentage of total viewing time to the Elsie displays during phase C1 of the
single-malfunction trials (scenarios #5 through #10). Unlike in Figure 4-1, only data from the
trials graded Correct were included . The number of qualified trials was 23 for Elsie and 21 for
Besi. In Besi trials, operator selection of the proximal cause fault message brought up by the
associated checklist in the EPV automatically, fixing the duration at 0.5 sec. Because they were
such short durations, the display usages were not examined for C1 for Besi (however, the total
length of the Besi bar was shown in the chart for comparison). In sharp contrast, manually
navigating through the EPV menu to bring up the targeted checklist in Elsie took an average of
20 sec.
EPS Displays, 4.6%
Message, 3.6%
	
Others,
/ 8.9%
PFD,	 FaultElsie	 17.3%
	
Log,
13.6%
Checklist,	 Average
52.0%	 1	 1 20 sec
Besi
I Average
0.5 sec
15	 20	 25	 30	 35	 40	 45
sec
Figure 4-2. Display page usage during C1
The EPS Displays ROI was comprised of the EPS Sum (0.3%), the EPS Main (2.1%), and the
EPS Loads (2.1%). The Others category included Fault Sum (1.2%), the EPS Switch Panels
(2.4%) and lesser amounts due to saccades or noise.
Importantly, the Elsie graph reveals that more than half of the total C1 time was spent looking at
the checklist menu, which contained a list of checklist titles for EPS malfunctions. However,
operators also continued to examine the list of fault messages on the Fault Log and the messages
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contained in the Fault Message Area, presumably to help select the proper checklist name in the
checklist menu.
Display usage for the latter stages of the fault management task are included in Appendix A for
those who what to compare with these early stages.
4.2. PFD Monitoring
Table 4-1 summarizes the participants’ PFD look statistics separately for operations concept
(Elsie versus Besi) and operator workload (single malfunction versus multiple malfunction runs)
during the time that operators were actively involved in fault management activities. For this
analysis, all trials
 , regardless of the scenarios or grading results, were included, as the focus here
was on understanding how the operations concept (Elsie versus Besi) influenced the division of
attention between fault management and the PFD-based color noticing task.
Table 4-1. PFD Look Statistics during On-Task Time
Scenario Difficulty
x ACAWS N
% time of
PFD look
Number of PFD
looks per minute
Average PFD look
duration [sec]
Single-mal 24 20.6% 14.6 0.86Elsie
Single-mal 24 26.5% 17.1 0.95Besi
Multiple-mal 16 16.5% 11.9 0.86Elsie
Multiple-mal 16 20.8% 14.1 0.90Besi
As shown in the column labeled “Number of PFD looks per minute”, during the period that
operators were actively working a mal function, they glanced at the PFD more often with Besi
than with Elsie. Summing the amount of time that operators “borrowed” from fault management
to look at the PFD, and expressing
 that summed value as a percentage of the total fault resolution
time, the summed value (called “% time of PFD look” in the Table) was higher for Besi than for
Elsie. Paired t-test results indicated significant effects of operations concept on both measures in
the single-malfunction scenarios (scenarios #5 through #10; t(23) = 3.36, p < 0.01 for % PFD
looking time; t(23) = 3.96, p < 0.01 for the number of looks per minute) and the multiple-
malfunction scenarios (scenarios #11 through #14; t(15) = 2.95, p = 0.01 for the % time; t(15) =
3.24, p < 0.01 for the number of looks per minute). The average duration of the looks to the PFD
did not show any statistically significant effect of operations concept.
These analyses are broken out further in Appendix B for the latter phases of the fault
management task, for those who want to check the consistency of PFD task-related behavior
between all fault management phases.
4.3. Further Breakdown of Display Usage during D1
Section 4.1 provided an aggregate look at eye movement behavior during D1. However, that
analysis finessed the fact that over the course of a typical diagnosis phase, three very different
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D1
EPS Sum,
Fault Sum	 EPS Main, or
ECLSS
Fault Log Checklist
C1
. F
display formats appeared in the Main Display Area. We now “drill down” to a more fine-
grained analysis of eye fixation behavior separately for each format.
4.3.1. Outlines of the Display Usage Flow during D1
As touched upon in Section 1.4, even though there was no rigid order of the display usages
(a) Elsie
D1
	
D2
Fault Sum	 EPS or ECLSS	 Checklist
(b) Besi
Figure 4-3. Outlines of Display Usage Flow during D1
imposed to the participants during the D1 phase, there was a suggested order that naturally made
sense. Figure 4-3 illustrates the outlines of the suggested usage for each display format during
D1.
For both Elsie and Besi, the flow naturally started with Fault Sum, which was always present
when the malfunction occurred. Through color coding of off-nominal elements, Fault Sum
offered “at a glance” information concerning which system, EPS or ECLSS, contained the
malfunction, and which components of these two systems were affected. Although we included
ECLSS (loads) malfunctions during our training phase, all malfunctions were in the EPS system
during the data collection runs. Operators were instructed to replace Fault Sum with EPS
summary displays, as this would give them further insight into EPS status and support their
efforts to determine the fault message corresponding to the proximal cause.
At this point, the natural flow for Elsie and Besi deviated. For Elsie, operators were instructed to
bring up the Fault Log display, again, to locate the fault message most closely associated with
the proximal cause. By contrast, Besi enabled selection of the “most-proximal” fault message
automatically (in practice, no operator brought up Fault Log when working malfunctions with
Besi). Thus, in Figure 4-3, Fault Log was omitted from the D1 display usage flow for Besi.
Figure 4-4 plots the probabilities of the use of each display across D1 for Elsie. All data from
scenarios #5 through #14, regardless of the grading results, were included. For the multiple-
malfunction trials (#11 through #14), only the data from the first malfunction were included.
The horizontal axes were normalized mission elapsed time (MET) where 0% indicates the
beginning of D1, and 100% indicates the end. These
 plots reveal that, in compliance with
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Figure 4-4. Elsie Display Usage Probabilities during D1
training, Fault Sum viewing dominated the beginning of the period, EPS Sum or EPS Main
dominated the middle, and Fault Log dominated toward the end. Importantly, operators
interrupted their fault management activities to examine the PFD at a fairly constant rate
throughout D1. The Message area was also examined at a fairly uniform rate except for the
sharp peak at the very beginning, when the operators were looking at and extinguishing the
visual Master Alarm.
Figure 4-8 shows the same plots for Besi. Again, all the data from the scenarios #5 through #14
were included. For the multiple-malfunction trials (#11 through #14), only the data from the first
malfunction were used. The plots show that the Fault Sum was used during the beginning of D1,
while the EPS was consulted during the middle to the end of D1. The PFD and Message areas
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Figure 4-5. Besi Display Usage Probabilities during D1
were examined fairly uniformly throughout.
4.3.2. Display Usages and Fixation Transitions by D1 Sub-Phase
Figures 4-4 and 4-5 indicate that D1 could be divided roughly into distinct sub-phases of
information acquisition activity, depending on which display occupied the Main Area: A Fault
Sum sub-phase, an EPS display(s) sub-phase, and a Fault Log (Elsie) sub-phase. When Fault
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Sum was displayed in the Main Area, the EPS-related and Fault Log displays were unavailable.
Therefore, the probabilities of the usage of the displays not shown were zero. Furthermore, to
“swap-out” display formats in the Main Area, operators needed to navigate to, and select, edge
key labels. That means that the probabilities of direct visual transitions between Main-Area
display formats were always zero. In this section, display usage during D1 was examined
separately by sub-phases.
In addition, in the omnibus analyses reported in Section 4.1.1, there were ambiguities with
respect to the Message Area, which included the edge keys as well as the Fault Message Area
(and, in case of Besi, the Root-Cause and the System Status Areas). Viewing fault messages and
viewing edge keys supported two very distinct tasks. To differentiate between looks to the edge
keys and fault messages, therefore, video recordings of the operators during the trials were
consulted. During periods when it was clear that operators were moving the current cursor focus
among the edge key labels, the corresponding fixations were classified as edge key fixations .
The remainin
 g fixations in the Message Area, including ambiguous cases, were classified as fault
message area fixation. Since video examination was a labor-intensive process, only D1 fixations
were classified with this method.
The Fault Sum Sub-Phase
Figure 4-6 plots the participants’ display usages during D1 when Fault Sum was displayed in the
Main Area. The data from all the paired trials (i.e., scenarios #5 through #14), regardless of the
performance grading, were included. The grand means of the total durations of the periods when
Fault Sum was displayed were 10.2 seconds in Elsie, and 11.8 seconds in Besi.
Table 4-3 summarizes various facets of operators’ oculomotor behavior for the major Elsie and
Besi display formats. The PFD was examined more frequently and for longer average durations
in Besi than in Elsie, which explains the large percent PFD usages shown in the Besi bar graph in
Figure 4-9. By contrast, Fault Sum and Fault Messages were examined less frequently, and for
Edge Keys, 6.8%
Others, 10.3%
Elsie
Besi
PFD,
18.6%
Fault Sum,
38.4%
PFD,
25.5%
Fault Sum,
26.5%
Fault Mssg	 Average
25.8%	 10.2 sec
Figure 4-6. Display page usage during D1
for Fault Sum Sub-Phase
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shorter average durations, in Besi than in Elsie. Note, also, that the edge keys received more
frequent visits and longer average durations in Besi than in Elsie. These results suggest that
Elsie’s edge key label configuration afforded more efficient display navigation operations than
Besi’s matrix configuration, possibly because Elsie’s edge key labels were spread over a wider
area.
Table 4-3. Look Statistics during D1 when Fault Sum occupied the Main Area
Elsie Besi
Number of Average Number of Average
Display looks per duration per Display looks per duration per
minute look [sec] minute look [sec]
PFD 12.8 0.87 PFD 16.2 0.94
Fault Sum 21.7 1.06 Fault Sum 18.8 0.85
Fault Mssg 9.6 1.61 Fault Mssg 8.5 1.35
Edge Keys 5.9 0.69 Edge Keys 7.0 1.59
Figure 4-7 illustrates the fixat ion transition probabilities among the most important ROI. The
percentage values indicate the probabilities of transitioning in the shown direction from the
origin ROI. Figure 4-7, combined with the numbers of looks per minute in Table 4-3, reveals
that for Elsie, most fixation traffic occurred between adjacent display areas, that is, between
Fault Sum and the PFD, and between Fault Sum and the fault messages/edge keys. Compared to
these levels, traffic between the PFD and the nonadjacent (lower) ROIs (i.e., fault messages and
the edge keys) was relatively light. In Besi, by contrast, traffic between the lower regions and
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the immediately adjacent (Fault Sum) display was considerably lighter, due to a pronounced
increase in traffic between the lower regions and the (nonadjacent) PFD.
The EPS sub -phase
Figure 4-8 plots operators’ time on display formats during D1 when the EPS displays (i.e., the
EPS Sum or EPS Main for Elsie) or the EPS (Besi) were present in the Main Area (i.e.,
following a decision by the operator to replace the Fault Sum display with one of the EPS system
summary displays). Data from all the paired trials (i.e., the scenarios #5 through #14), regardless
of the performance grading, were included. The grand means of the total durations of the periods
Fault Mssg 8.5%
	 Edge Keys, 8.2%
Others, 10.1%
PFD,	 EPS Displays,	 Average
Elsie
	 18.6%	 54.6%	 10.8 sec
Fault Mssg, 11.1 %
Others, 10.3%
PFD,	 EPS,
	
Edge
	 Average
Besi	 22.6%
	
34.7%
	 18e7%	 9.0 sec
10	 12 sec 14
Figure 4-8. Display page usage during D1
for EPS sub phase
when the EPS-related displays were present were 10.8 seconds in Elsie and 9.0 seconds in Besi.
Table 4-4 summarizes eye movement behavior for the major displays used in Elsie and Besi.
Replicating the pattern found in the Fault Sum Phase (Table 4-3), the PFD was again examined
more frequently with Besi than with Elsie. Elsie’s EPS Sum and EPS Main displays were also
examined heavily during this period, consistent with the large (over 50%) usage fraction shown
in the Elsie bar graph in Figure 4-8. Again, Besi’s edge keys were fixated more frequently and
for longer durations than Elsie’s. However, unlike the previous period, and unlike Elsie during
this period
 , operators working with the Besi interfaces did not need to use the edge keys to call
up another other display in the main area. Thus, the exact reason why Besi’s edge keys received
more operator attention than Elsie's is unclear.
Table 4-4. Look Statistics during D1 when EPS-related displays were shown
Elsie Besi
Number of	 Average Number of	 Average
Display looks per	 duration per Display looks per	 duration per
minute	 look [sec] minute	 look [sec]
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PFD 12.6 0.85 PFD 14.3 0.95
EPS Sum & 20.4 1.61 EPS 16.6 1.25EPS Main
Fault Mssg 5.0 1.02 Fault Mssg 5.5 1.22
Edge Keys 4.7 1.05 Edge Keys 8.1 1.38
Figure 4-9 illustrates the fixation transition probabilities among the ROIs during the EPS period.
The bar-graph information in Figure 4-8, together with the number of looks per minute
 data in
Table 4-4, have already revealed that, in Elsie, IAEs to EPS Sum or EPS Main accounted for
more than 50% of the total time. Clearly, the graphical information about system status and
system functioning contained in these displays played a prominently role in fault diagnosis.
Figure 4-12 reveals that some of the heaviest fixation traffic occurred between these EPS
displays and the PFD. Traffic was considerable, if slightly more moderate, between the EPS
displays and the lower regions, and moderate traffic also occurred from the lower regions to the
PFD. Traffic from the PFD to the lower regions was again very light. In Besi, the major
differences from these patterns came about because traffic got much heavier from the lower
regions to the (nonadjacent) PFD, and also heavier (though to a lesser exten t) in the reverse
direction, from the PFD to the lower regions. This replicates the pattern in the earlier Fault Sum
sub-phase.
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Figure 4-9. Transition Probabilities during D1 during the EPS sub phase.
The Fault Log Sub-Phase
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Fault Log was never selected in Besi. Therefore, Figure 4-10 plots operators’ display usages
when Fault Log occupied the Main Area for Elsie only. The data from all the paired trials (i.e.,
the scenarios #5 through #14), regardless of the performance grading, were included. As shown
in the Table, the mean duration of this period was 15.8 seconds. Almost 60% of this time was
occupied by looking at Fault Log itself.
Fault Mssg 2.6%	 Edge Keys, 2.7%
Others, 6.0%
PFD,	 Fault Log,	 ICTstec
Elsie
	 18.6%
	
58.7%	 , 	 A11.4%5.8 sec
Figure 4-10. Display page usage during D1
During Fault Log Sub-Phase (Elsie)
Table 4-5 lists the summary oculomotor statistics for the major Elsie displays during this period.
Although fixation frequency was not noticeably different between the PFD and Fault Log,
reading the densely packed fault messages produced an average fixation duration, 2.38 sec, that
was by far the longest of all analyzed durations in Tables 4-3, 4-4, and 4-5. This explains the
large discrepancy in amount of time spent on the PFD compared to Fault Log (18.6% versus
58.7%) in Figure 4-10.
Table 4-5. Look Statistics during D1 when Fault Log was shown
Elsie
Number of Average
Display looks per duration per
minute look [sec]
PFD 13.0 0.87
Fault Log 17.1 2.38
Checklist 5.0 1.36
Figure 4-11 plots the fixation transition probabilities among the major Elsie displays. Figures 4-
11, combined with the information in Figure 4-10 and the number of looks per minute data in
Table 4-5, indicate heavy eye traffic between the PFD and the Fault Log. However, operators
also started to turn their attention to the checklist area, presumably to start the process of
associating fault log messages with the checklist titles in the EPV menus, in preparation for
selecting the appropriate checklist from the EPV menu.
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Figure 4-11. Transition Probabilities during D1 in Elsie
During Fault Log Sub-Phase
Re-visitations
A fundamental difference between the PFD-based task and the fault management task is that the
PFD-based task was based on detection of a periodic, and somewhat temporally unpredictable,
color change, so it is not surprising that operators elected to glance at the PFD on a regular basis.
The fault management task, on the other hand, involved multiple discrete sources of information
whose content was largely fixed (static) from the outset of the malfunction. As we discussed, the
static nature of the fault management information meant that, in principle, operators could have
elected to process all diagnosis-relevant information from a particular ROI during a single IAE.
An alternative strategy would be to acquire information from the relevant displays in a more
incremental fashion, across
 everal distinct IAEs, separated by IAEs to other regions of interest.
To distinguish between these possibilities, we counted the number of trials that involved two or
more distinct IAEs (i.e., at least one revisit) to three malfunction-relevant ROI’s: Fault Sum, the
lower C&W system Message Area, and the EPS displays. For Fault Sum, fully 84% of the trials
involved at least two IAE’s (one revisit), and 68% involved more than two IAEs (i.e., two or
more revisits after the initial IAE). Very similar percentages were obtained for both the
continuously visible Message Area and the EPS displays.
These results obviously favor an incremental information acquisition strategy, separated by
IAE’s to other regions of interest, as opposed to an exhaustive “all-in-one” strategy. In addition,
note that across all D1 phases, there were always two ROIs containing fault-related information:
either Fault Sum, the EPS displays, or Fault Log in the Main Display Area, and the continuously
viewable subset of C&W fault messages in the lower Fault Message Area. As revealed in
Figures 4-7 and 4 -9, there was considerable eye-movement traffic between these regions,
particularly in Elsie (for example, more than half of the traffic from the Fault Message Area went
directly to Fault Sum; see Figure 4-7). Together with the revisiting results, the pattern suggests
that, not only did operators adopt an incremental information acquisition strategy, but they
supported their proximal-cause determination process by cross-checking the information
gathered from an individual IAE to one fault-management relevant display against the
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information garnered from an IAE to the other. This cross-checking strategy is particularly
noteworthy, given that the format of the information across the ROIs was so distinct, being text-
based in one region (Fault Message Area), and more graphical (e.g., EPS Sum) in the other.
5. Discussion
In our earlier SHFE report (Hayashi et al., 2007), we assessed two concepts for fault
management operational concepts, Elsie and Besi, using a traditional suite of human factors
performance measures, such as completion (response) time for the individual phases of the fault
management task, error rates,
 and subjective assessments of workload and usability. These
measures were sufficient to reveal the general impact of automation on fault management,
including the fact that, compared to Elsie, Besi reduced the duration of the D1 (diagnosis) phase
by approximately 50%, and that faul t management activities impaired performance on the PFD
task more with Elsie than Besi. These measures might be sufficient to allow program managers
to determine whether targeted operational concepts and associated crew interfaces meet high-
level requirements for accuracy and workload. However, they provide little explicit guidance to
the operational concept design process. Eye movement analyses allow us to fill in valuable gaps
in our understanding of operator’s information acquisition patterns and strategies, and provide
much more explicit guidance for operational concept and user interface design.
5.1. Impact of Automation: Elsie versus Besi
As noted, compared to Elsie, working malfunctions with the Besi interfaces reduced the duration
of the diagnosis (D1) phase by approximately 50% (an operationally significant 19 sec). Display
usage patterns revealed that this reduction was largely a consequence of the fact that Elsie
involved much more extensive processing of text information within text-rich display formats.
Of the 19 sec Elsie penalty, fully half (9.4 sec) was accounted for by reading C&W fault
messages on the Fault Log display. Moreover, in the period immediately following the initial
diagnosis stage (Stage C1), navigating to and bringing up the appropriate procedure checklist
consumed a further 20 sec of operator time in Elsie, compared to less than a second in Besi,
where the operation was automated. Once again, the majority of the time penalty required to
complete Stage C1 in Elsie was accounted for by processing text within text-rich displays
(specifically, the menus of systems and checklist titles on the EPV and the list of fault messages
on the Fault Log).
Taken together, these findings highlight an important conclusion: Since processing cluttered text-
rich displays (see, e.g., Figure 2-9) confers a major time penalty on human operators, designers
of fault management operational concepts should minimize the need to present and process
information on such display formats whenever possible.
Fortunately, the development of a new generation of crewed vehicles provides many
opportunities to do so. An advanced C&W system with proximate-cause diagnosis capabilities
obviously reduces or eliminates the need to process fault messages on a fault log di splay. Other
opportunities may be less obvious. Suppose, for example, vehicle weight and software
development, test, and validation considerations tip the scale in favor of a less capable (but less
computationally intensive) Elsie-like fault management system, as opposed to a system with
Besi’s automation. It would still be quite feasible to reduce the need to process lists of text
elements on EPV menus with direct retrieval of the procedure checklists via fault log messages.
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That is, the Fault Log page could include a “focus” bar to enable cursor focus on individual fault
messages. Following the lead of the B777, participants could scroll the focus bar to whatever
fault message they determined to be the proximal cause, select that choice with a button press,
and retrieve the corresponding checklist in the EPV area automatically. Our results suggest that
this relatively modest modification to the Elsie operational concept could result in as much as 20
seconds of savings, largely because it would eliminate the need to bring up a checklist via EPV
menus. Since the functional links between the C&W database and the EPV database necessary to
produce this capability could be programmed in advance, the performance benefit would be
achieved with little additional demand on onboard computational resources.
This line of thought brings up an important ancillary point. EPV development for Orion could
proceed with a mindset that the EPV would operate largely independently of other onboard
software systems, with the major exception of vehicle commanding channels. This “stand-
alone” perspective would naturally produce the “menu-based” concept for navigating to and
retrieving EPV checklists; indeed, with a functionally self-contained operational concept, an
alternative method for checklist navigation is not immediately obvious. However, a much
different concept for checklist retrieval comes about from considering the C&W system and the
EPV as interacting components supporting the same overarching task (real-time fault
management). The present results provide a strong empirical case that the EPV and the C&W
system should proceed from an integrated (task-oriented) perspective. Our results provide
empirical “benchmarks” against which to assess the operational benefits that arise from building
functional linkages between the software for these traditionally isolated systems.
Such linkages would also help mitigate the risk that transitioning to the EPV from paper may
actually reduce fault management efficiency in particular circumstances. Paper provides a
degree of flexibility, particularly for accessing checklists, that a standalone EPV may be hard
pressed to match. For example, in the shuttle cockpits, the checklists for working the most likely
propulsion system malfunctions during ascent are available, not only within flight data file
booklets, but also on cue cards within easy reach of the flight crew. Compared to the brief time
required to grab and start reading a cue card, our results suggest that the time needed to navigate
through EPV menus to call up these procedures might translate into a considerable performance
decrement. A more user-centered (integrated) approach to the design and evaluation of fault
management systems can reveal opportunities to ameliorate these potential drawbacks, by A)
empirically determining those activities that suffer from the electronic transition, and B)
suggesting opportunities to ameliorate them through targeted automation.
Even if the choice was made to implement a standalone or “bare-bones” C&W system, with no
functional links to the EPV, our results still suggest design options that could have considerable
utility. For example, designers could exploit preexisting failure modes, effects, and criticality
analyses to organize the list of fault messages on the fault log, perceptually segregating the most
common “parent” fault messages from the most common “children” (for example, grouping the
children messages and indenting them under the “parent” messages, using different font sizes for
parents and children, or some combination), enabling “at a glance” perceptual segregation of the
subset of generated fault messages that form the best proximal-cause candidates. Alternatively,
with just a modest additional software integration effort, text-processing demands could be
reduced by visually linking the information on the Fault Log page with the checklist menus
through “yoked” focus bars. That is, assuming the text line (checklist title) with current cursor
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focus is indicated on the EPV menu with a focus bar, the matching entry (text line) within the
fault log page (if present) would be highlighted with a corresponding focus bar, and move in
concert with each other while the operator was scrolling. That way, the critical connection
would be established perceptually, making it easier to cross-check (integrate) the information on
the two displays with a minimum of extraneous text processing.
5.2. Display Real Estate Requirements
Operators were trained to incorporate both caution and warning (fault messages) information and
information from the more graphical displays (such as the Fault Sum, EPS Sum, EPS Main, and
Besi’s EPS displays
 ) into their proximal-cause diagnosis strategies. However, there was
considerable freedom over just how to acquire and integrate the information from the various
sources. One strategic issue is particularly germane because of possible severe restrictions on
display real estate available to support fault management operations. Our operators acquired
information from the relevant displays in a temporally distributed manner with multiple
individual information extraction episodes interleaved with episodes from other display areas.
This suggests that designers should ensure that their caution and warning interfaces allow for
simultaneous viewing of graphical/system summary displays (i.e., the Fault Sum and the EPS-
related displays) and fault message displays (such as the Fault Log display and the Fault
Message area), as opposed to forcing the two formats to share the same real estate. By
extension, it may have been quite detrimental in Elsie to force operators to time-share the Fault
Log display with the more graphical EPS sum and Fault Sum displays, preventing simultaneous
viewing of these display formats. We speculate that if the interface was changed to allow
simultaneous presentation of Fault Log and the more graphical display formats, thus enabling an
interleaving strategy across all phases of D1, the duration of the fault diagnosis stage would have
been reduced. This change could be easily implemented, by simply populating the EPV area
with the C&W fault log as soon as the fault messages are generated.
From a more theoretical perspective, the evidence for repeated sampling of the same display
areas during the diagnosis stage (in particular, repeated viewing of the message and EPS
summary displays during the middle segment of D1) suggests that information acquisition during
diagnosis is not an “all-or-none” phenomenon. Factors that might be contributing to this are:
1) Fault Diagnosis is a “Random-Walk”. The process of converging on a “proximal cause”
decision is essentially an exercise in deciding on (selecting) one from a set of candidates defined
by the fault messages generated by the caution and warning system, supported by other forms of
fault management information. One way of modeling the diagnostic process would be to
consider each sequential information sampling activity (fixation) as providing incremental
evidence for or against each individual candidate in a hypothesis set. Suppose each candidate is
associated with its own “evidence counter,” which would be either incremented when the
information extracted from the current fixation provides evidence for that candidate, or
decremented when the fixation supports another candidate. In this framework, the value of the
counter for each hypothesis would follow a random walk over time until the count (strength of
evidence) for one candidate exceeded the sum of the counts for the alternatives by some critical
ratio. In this framework, re-fixating previously sampled regions would continue until the critical
ratio was exceeded, at which point the operator would move on to the next stage in the fault
management task (selecting the correct checklist). As long as the evidence accumulation process
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is noisy and incremental, repeated fixations on the same displays would be necessary to drive the
“winning” hypothesis past threshold.
2) Memory decay. We know from the eye movement analyses in Table 3-1 that participants
implemented a more-or-less continuous sampling strategy vis a vis the PFD, as revealed by the
constant count of PFD fixations per minute during the active fault management period (a rate
which was, however, higher for Besi than for Elsie; see below). Importantly, each distinct check
of the PFD interrupted fault management activities. It is quite possible that the information
acquired from the fixations preceding each PFD interruption decayed during the “interruption
period, forcing operators to re-acquire previously-processed information following the
interruption. Again, this would result in an increase in the incidence of re-fixation behavior on
previously sampled displays and display sub-regions.
3) Multi-tasking strategies. Last but not least, the eye movement analyses revealed that the multi-
tasking performance benefits associated with the Besi interface reflected a simple continuous
multi-tasking strategy whereby operators interrupted fault management task activities to sample
the PFD more frequently while working malfunctions with Besi than with Elsie. Importantly,
providing a greater level of automated support for fault management enabled more than just
shorter and more accurate fault management operations per se. It also engendered more
willingness on the part of participants to spread their attention between fault management
activities and other simultaneous operational demands, particularly from areas further away from
the PFD. It is quite noteworthy that this benefit was not confined to the diagnosis phase itself,
and was therefore not narrowly associated with the automated proximal-cause capability that
came with Besi. Instead, we speculate that all of the different sources of automated aid provided
by Besi combined to influence a high-level scheduling algorithm to adjust one of its parameters
to allow for a higher interruption frequency.
The pattern of transition probabilities in Besi and Elsie in the first two sub-phases of the
diagnosis phase (when Fault Sum was up [Figure 4-7], and when the EPS display(s) were up
[Figure 4-9]), provide further interesting clues to the impact of Elsie on operator’s attentional
strategies. In both figures, the most notable change in traffic between the various regions of
interest was spatial. In Elsie, traffic patterns were highly influenced by proximity; operators
were most likely to transition to a region of interest immediately adjacent to the region sampled
on the previous fixation. For example, there was relatively strong traffic between the lowest
regions (the Fault Message Area and Edge Keys) and the immediately adjacent region (either
Fault Sum or the EPS display[s]). There was relatively light traffic between the lower regions
and the PFD. In Besi, by contrast, the influence of physical proximity was considerably weaker,
as evidenced by the large increase in traffic between the lower regions and the PFD.
There are two possible accounts for this change. It may be that programming large distance
saccades imposes more of a cognitive load than short-distance saccades (Ballard, Hayhoe, &
Pelz, 1995). Since Besi automated more activities than Elsie, the Besi concept “freed up”
cognitive resources to support more long-distance saccades. Alternatively, the increase in long-
distance traffic in Besi may have been a more task-related effect. Since, in Elsie, operators were
more cognitively involved on the fault management task, top-down attentional settings may have
been imposed that assigned the central displays (that were all fault-management information
displays) a higher saliency than they were accorded in Besi (Folk, Remington, and Johnston,
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1992). Operators were thus more likely to visit these central displays than they were in Besi,
which would masquerade as a physical proximity effect.
6. Conclusions
In this follow-up to Hayashi, et al. (2007), we used the results of more fine-grained analyses of
participants’ eye movements to derive guidelines and suggestions for interface design and
human-machine functional allocation for fault management systems on next-generation
spacecraft. Due to weight and schedule pressures, it is at present unclear how much automation
will be built into the Orion Block 1 fault management system, so it is unclear how closely the
fault management operations concept will resemble the highly automated Besi as compared to
more manual Elsie. One of the biggest question marks is whether Orion’s C&W system will
incorporate an automated diagnostic capability. Eye movement analyses provided further insight
into the impacts of incorporating such a capability, some of which were not obvious from the
earlier report. In addition, however, the analyses revealed some important performance benefits
from other forms of Besi automation, particularly for information retrieval and display. These
forms are less computationally complex, and would generate far less development and
operational risk, than proximal-cause software. They could be added to an Elsie-style fault
management system to create an “Elsie-Besi hybrid” that achieves a substantial fraction of the
Besi performance enhancements for a relatively modest investment in software development.
In addition to providing a more sensitive set of tools with which to evaluate the impact of
automation, the eye movement analyses identified display formats and concepts that were
particularly time consuming for operators to process. Uncovering and quantifying these
inefficiencies enabled us to make specific recommendations for the fault management
operational concept. Once again, many of these redesign ideas could be achieved with little or
no additional demands on the onboard computational resources.
One point is clear. If caution and warning systems development proceeds largely independently
of the development of the EPV and its supporting software, the operations community will miss
a major opportunity to improve the efficiency of fault management activities. In the past, such
stove piping of the two fault management activities was a natural product of the fact that,
because procedures were paper-based, there were no opportunities for functional integration.
Today, when the databases supporting the cockpit displays for both systems are going electronic,
operationally significant improvements can be achieved by building in functional links between
the caution and warning system and the EPV.
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8. Appendix A: Eye-movement analyses following C1
8.1. Percent Display Usages during D2
Figure 8-1 shows the percent usages of the displays during D2 of the single-malfunction trials.
As in the previous bar charts, only the data from the trials graded Correct were included in the
bar charts. The grand average durations were 41 sec for Elsie and 38 sec for Besi.
EPS Displays, 7.6%
Elsie PFD,	
EPS Sw	 Checklist,
23.0%
	
Panels,
	 40.9%21.8%
Besi	 PFD,	 EPS,	 I	 Checklist,
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Figure 8-1. Display page usage during D2
The Elsie’s EPS Displays ROI was comprised of the EPS Main (5.8%) and the EPL Loads
(1.8%). The EPS Switch Panels contained the EPS Dist Switch Panel (12.5%) and the EPS
Loads Switch Panel (9.2%). The Others of Elsie included the Fault Log (0.2%) and the Message
(0.2%), and the Others of Besi the Fault Sum (0.2%) and the Message (2.3%). The remaining of
the Others categories was saccades among ROI or noise.
The D2 process was basically led by the checklist instructions. Indeed, the Checklist ROI
accounted for large portion of the total D2 durations in both Elsie and Besi. The EPS Displays
(Elsie), the EPS Switch Panels (Elsie), and the EPS (Besi) displays were also used as required by
the checklist steps. Interestingly, Besi contained slightly more total PFD look than Elsie, despite
that the average total D2 durations were shorter for Besi than Elsie. This point will be revisited
in Section 3.2.2.
8.2. Percent Display Usages during C2
Figure 8-2 shows the percent usages of the displays during C2 of the single-malfunction trials.
As in the previous bar charts, only the data from the trials graded Correct were included in the
bar charts. The grand average durations were 14 sec for Elsie and 1.6 sec for Besi.
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Figure 8-2. Display page usage during C2
The EPS Displays ROI encompassed the EPS Main (1.8%) and the EPS Loads (0.1%). The EPS
Switch Panels contained the EPS Dist Switch Panel only (i.e., no EPS Loads Switch Panel). The
Others category of Elsie included the Fault Log (2.4%) and the Message (1.3%). The Others of
Besi consisted of the Message (0.7%). The remaining of the Others categories were saccades
among the ROI or noise.
As expected, the Elsie graph shows that the largest portion of the total C2 time was spent on the
Checklist ROI.
8.3. Percent Display Usages during R
Figure 8-3 shows the percent usages of the displays during R of the single-malfunction trials. As
in the previous bar charts, only the data from the trials graded Correct were included in the bar
charts. The grand
 average durations were 63 sec for Elsie and 67 sec for Besi.
The EPS Switch Panels contained the EPS Dist Switch Panel (6.0%) and the EPS Loads Switch
Panel (33.6%). The Others of Elsie included the EPS Main (0.2%) and the Message (0.2%). The
remaining Others of Elsie and all Others of Besi were saccades between ROIs and noise.
Like the D2 process, the R process was also basically led by the checklist instructions. As a
result, the Checklist ROI accounted for large portion of the total R durations in both Elsie and
Besi. The EPS Switch Panels (Elsie) or the EPS (Besi) displays were used as the checklist
required the recovery switch throws. Again, as in the D2 phase, the participants had looked at
PFD for more time in Besi than in Elsie. This time, it had caused longer average total R
durations for Besi than for Elsie. See the Section 3.2.2 for further analysis.
55 of 57
PFD, I EPS Sw Panels,	 Checklist,
22.2%
	 39.6%	 1	 32.0%
Average
63 secElsie
PFD,	 EPS,	 I Checklist,
28.6%	 34.5%	 23.7%
Average
67 secBesi
Others,
6.2%
Message, 5.5%
Others, 7.7%
90	 20	 30	 40	 so	 60	 70
sec
Figure 8-3. Display page usage during R
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9. Appendix B: PFD Look Statistics during D2 and R
In Figures 8-1 and 8-3, the bar charts showed that more of the total D2 and R durations was spent
monitoring the PFD in Besi than in Elsie. To further investigate this result, the three PFD-look
statistics during D2 and R, respectively, were computed and summarized in Table 9-1. Only the
data from the single-malfunction trial
 s (#5 through #10) were included. Note that the values of
the % time of PFD look are slightly different from those shown in the bar charts, because the
values in Table 4-2 include the data from the trials categorized as Good and Failed as well (the
bar charges included the only data from the single-malfunction trials graded Correct). This
maximized the number of data subjected to the paired t-tests to be performed next. Again, the
focus was how their PFD-monitoring performance was influenced by fault man agement concept ,
regardless of the specific fault management task (i.e., phase) and malfunction-handling accuracy.
Table 9-1. PFD Look Statistics during Phases D2 and R
(a) During D2
Scenario Difficulty N % time of Number of PFD Average PFD look
x Concept PFD look looks per minute duration [sec]
Single-mal 24 20.9% 15.0 0.84Elsie
Single-mal 24 24.9% 19.6 0.80Besi
(b) During R
Scenario Difficulty N % time of Number of PFD Average PFD look
x Concept PFD look looks per minute duration [sec]
Single-mal 23 22.3% 16.5 0.84Elsie
Single-mal 23 27.3% 17.4 0.96Besi
In the D2 phase, the paired t-test results indicated that the participants looked at the PFD
significantly more frequently in Besi than in Elsie, t(23) = 3.18, p < 0.01. There was no
statistically significant difference in the percent time of PFD look and the average PFD look
durations.
In the R phase, the results also showed that operators looked at the PFD for a significantly larger
proportion of the total duration with Besi than with Elsie, t(22) = 2.29, p = 0.03, and the average
PFD look durations were marginally longer with Besi than with Elsie, t(22) = 1.86, p = 0.077.
No statistical significance was found for the number of PFD looks per minute. Note that the total
number of data included, N, was 23 in the R, because one participant did not finish the R phase
of scenario #7 in Besi. Thus, this trial and the paired trial (#8 in Elsie) of this participant were
not included in the t-tests.
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